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ABSTRACT
Divorce: A Matter of Rights and Responsibilities
by
Mary Jane Watson Brick
Dr. Alan Zundel, Examination Committee Chair
Associate Professor o f Political Science and
Ethics and Policy Studies
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

In 1970, American society, steeped in a culture that emphasizes individual rights,
turned away from traditional fault-based divorce laws to embrace the easy, unilateral no
fault divorce laws in place today - divorce laws that have had unexpected and disastrous
economic consequences for the children of divorce. During the 1990s, many political and
social groups advocated divorce reform that would return divorce law to a more
traditional, fault-based system; however, no significant revisions to the no-fault laws
were passed, arguably because our cultural norms will not support a return to fault-based
divorce. Recognizing the underlying political and ethical theories that have shaped our
culture, and turning the focus away from one of limiting divorce to one o f improving the
circumstances o f children of divorce may be the first steps in creating national-level
public policy that can positively impact the worst outcomes o f divorce while presenting
the best chance o f passage into law.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Eva McNulty had been married to her husband Ralph for twenty-three years —none of
which had been happy. Both o f the McNultys drank too much, they fought often, and Eva
suspected Ralph of infidelity. Their marriage finally broke down when Eva discovered that
Ralph had committed incest with then: 13-year old daughter. Ralph was prosecuted,
convicted and sentenced to three to four years of hard labor. Eva sought divorce on the
grounds o f cruel and abusive treatment; her petition was denied. On appeal to the Supreme
Court o f the State of Massachusetts, the decision was upheld because "incest with the
daughter was not cruel or abusive to the wife, in either a physical or emotional sense."1The
court also denied the divorce on the basis o f adultery —even though adultery is clearly
implicit in the facts —because Eva had not explicitly alleged adultery as grounds for the
divorce.2
Barbara Welch thought she and Bill had it all —a comfortable marriage, two great
daughters, and her job as a secretary to help them make ends meet That was until she came

home one day to find her husband had beaten their oldest daughter and had left her a note
1Michael Wheeler, No-Fault Divorce, (Boston; Beacon Press, 1974), 2
2 Ibid.
1

2

that said he wouldn't be back —he had found someone younger, prettier and smarter, Her
husband called her later that night to let her know he had paid the apartment rent through
the end o f the week, but after that she would have to leave or come up with the rent herself
because he would no longer be supporting her. Having unilaterally decided to dissolve their
marriage under cover of the California no-fault divorce law. Bill left Barbara a single parent
o f two young daughters living on a secretary's wage.

In the following years, Bill

consistently earned over $50,000 annually and managed to send his $200 a month child
support about eight months out o f ten; he has not seen or called his daughters since he left.
These two cases serve to illustrate the extremes o f the effects of divorce law in
twentieth century America. Eva McNulty's case was heard in 1956, and the court’s decision
was never overturned.3 Barbara Welch's case occurred in California in 1973 shortly after
that state passed its sweeping, no-fault divorce law reform.
The voice of the communitarians is one of many in today's society calling for a return
to morality. While this call is ill defined in many quarters, for the communitarians it means
starting at home, in the family, and in particular with children. The communitarian platform
published in November of 1991 asserts that "bringing children into the world entails a
moral responsibility to provide, not only material necessities, but also moral education and
character formation."4 They lay the responsibility for the moral fiber of society squarely on
parents saying that "moral education is not a task that can be delegated," that fathers and

3 Ibid.
4 "The Responsive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities," The
Rrepnnrivp rn m m im ty Winter TQQT/T992: 7.

3

mothers who are too consumed by "making it" cannot "discharge their most elementary
duty to their children and fellow citizens."5
In particular, the communitarians stress that families headed by single parents are
most likely to fall short o f their duties to their children and for this reason divorce laws
should be modified. Specifically, the communitarians argue for modifying the economic
aspects o f divorce laws to protect children from bearing the brunt of the dissolution o f
marriages that leave the primary caretakers financially unable to provide adequate economic
support for the children in their care.
And the communitarians are not alone in this consensus —civic, spiritual, academic
and government leaders in many states have joined forces in an attempt to reverse or at least
mitigate the effects of no-fault divorce policies through family law and divorce policy
reform. Many states such as Iowa, Michigan, Colorado and Pennsylvania have family and
marriage forums that are actively supporting and introducing legislation to change current
divorce law. These groups also work diligently at the grass roots level, endeavoring to
educate and persuade the general populace that no-fault divorces are not m the community's
best interest.
This thesis proposes a means of changing current divorce laws to help protect children
of divorce while remaining true to our underlying cultural and political traditions, namely, a
commitment to the pursuit o f happiness and our long-standing reliance on individual rights,
hi other words, we need a uniform divorce policy that protects the rights o f children
without totally denying the rights o f unhappily married men and women to divorce.

5 Ibid., 7-8.
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Chapter Two of this thesis examines the cultural and political background o f divorce
law in America- This includes a brief history o f American divorce law, some comparisons
with the divorce laws of other Western cultures, and an investigation of the causes leading
to the divorce policy reform that swept the nation in the 1970s. Chapter Three follows this
theme with a discussion of how the no-fault reform was crafted and implemented, and an
in-depth review of the unintended outcomes o f that reform.
Chapter Four examines the dominant ethical and political theories of Western thought
that have influenced the development of the American culture over the last two hundred
years. Chapter Five then examines our political penchant for pursuing individual rights
(sometimes at the expense of the communal good), and the connection between the Lockean
theory of happiness, the inalienable (and culturally ingrained) American right of "pursuit o f
happiness," and our current reluctance to back away from a divorce policy that is so clearly
destructive to so many.
Chapter Six provides an analysis of the arguments for and against reforming no-fault
divorce policy. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion o f the most prominent
alternatives currently promulgated for developing a new policy.
Chapter Seven concludes with an analysis of the failure of reform in the 1990s and a
recommendation for divorce policy reform that will have a better chance of acceptance by
the American public.

CHAPTER 2

DIVORCE IN AMERICA

Despite the recent media and political attention, divorce is not a new phenomenon
in our society. Quite the contrary, as early as the 1630s the Puritans allowed couples to
divorce in cases o f willful desertion or adultery. In addition, these early divorce laws
allowed Americans to remarry —the Puritans held that a loveless union did no honor to
God, and they allowed divorced husbands and wives to remarry hoping that a stronger
union would result. Also, the Puritans treated divorce as a civil matter rather than an
ecclesiastical one (as was the practice in Europe), and while obtaining a divorce may not
have been easy nor socially acceptable, it was certainly more available than in other
societies of the time.1
The American reliance on civil law for divorce cases was in all likelihood a result
o f the resentment and resistance to the Church o f England’s conservative stand on divorce
which, at the time, mirrored the Roman Catholic policy. In addition, the early Americans

1 Talbot, Margaret, "Love, American Style: What the Alarmists About Divorce
D ont Get About Idealism," The New Republic, April 14,1997,32.
5
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saw the restrictive and unwieldy procedures for obtaining a divorce in England as
evidence o f the Crown's abuse o f authority.2
For instance, in England divorce cases came before the ecclesiastical courts (or in
very rare circumstances were granted as a special act o f Parliament), and were available
only to the wealthy. These divorces were rarely sought, more rarely granted, and did not
allow the divorced spouses to remarry —resulting instead in a divorce of "bed-and-board"
in which the husband and wife could live separately, but were, in essence, still married.3
This focus on the indissolubility o f marriage is understandable in light o f how English
(and most other nations') marriages were contracted.
Until the 16th century, marriage was seldom entered for the sake o f love. In fact,
many marriages were arranged during the infancy or childhood of one or both o f the
marital partners as a means o f increasing families’ property, wealth, loyalties and power,
and these ties and allegiances made marriages very stable. As Lawrence Stone put it,
There can be little doubt that the institutional marriage, in the arrangement
o f which parents and "friends" played a large part and financial
considerations loomed large, tended to create marital stability. This was
because the ties that bound the spouses together were more numerous and

2 Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Divorce Culture, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1997), 13.
3 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, The De-Moralization o f Society, (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1995), 111. It wasn't until the Divorce Act o f 1857 that divorces m England were
removed from the ecclesiastical courts and made a civil action (thus making divorce more
available to the lower, less wealthy classes). Interestingly, recent studies indicate that in
the first ten years of the law's enactment, slightly over 50 percent o f petitioners were
women —this coincides with current statistics on American divorces that show that more
women than men file for divorce today.

more permanent than those ephemeral psychosomatic experiences,
romantic love and sexual passion.4
The Protestant Reformation, however, sought to create a society that was run by
puritanical, biblical norms.5 In 1712, the theologian Benjamin Wadsworth wrote in his
treatise, The Well-Ordered Family, that love is a mutual duty of both husband and wife,
and that the husband who is not kind and loving "then shames his profession of
Christianity, he breaks the divine law, he dishonours God and himself, too." O f unloving,
unkind wives, Wadsworth wrote "she not only affronts her Husband, but also God, her
Maker, Lawgiver and Judge."6

Our Puritan Heritage
Promoting this norm, Protestantism created a new pattern of family life, "making
marriage a more ethical and personal matter and recognizing a mutual right of divorce,"
while still enforcing the patriarchal ideal passed down from medieval times.7 The Puritan
ideal was also one o f social harmony, and they believed that functional families were
particularly crucial to that harmonious society. Truly troubled marriages that ended in
desertion, or in one or the other spouse bringing a marital complaint before the minister

4 Lawrence Stone, The Family, Sex and Marriage in England: 1500 - 1800, (New
York: Harper and Row, 1977), 148.
5 Donald Kagan , Steven Ozment, and Frank M. Turner, The Western Heritage,
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1979), 393.
6 Benjamin Wadsworth, The Wed-Ordered Family, quoted in Talbot, 32.
7 Kagan, 393.
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or magistrate, disrupted this ideal. So, while marriage as a life long agreement was still
strenuously promoted, the Puritan leaders also allowed for divorce proceedings in
extreme cases of disruptive marriages. The hope was that by providing for divorce in
remedial cases, the family as an institution would be protected.8 These puritanical beliefs
are influential in the American predisposition to the right to divorce.
All o f the colonies, however, were not in accord with the Puritans on the matter of
divorce. As might be expected, divorce laws and practices varied from colony to colony,
as well as regionally.9 The New England colonies led the way in not only the most
lenient laws, but also in number of divorces granted. The New England colonies had well
established laws setting forth grounds for divorce (such as female adultery, desertion,
bigamy, abuse or cruelty, and impotence), for division of property and alimony upon
granting a divorce; and for determining whether or not divorcees could remarry.10
The middle colonies (New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Delaware), on the
other hand, allowed divorce but instituted few formal procedures and laws in this regard.
In part this was due to a lessening o f the puritanical influences felt in the New England
colonies, but more directly, it was a result of England's interference in the fashioning,
implementation and execution of laws in the colonies. Not only did England strike down

8 Glenda Riley, Divorce: An American Tradition (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991), 9-11.
9 Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder: A History of Divorce in Western Society
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 143.
10 See Riley, 25-29 and Phillips, 144-147.
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some o f the colonies* bills o f divorce, but the English government actually overturned
several divorces."
For these reasons, few divorces were granted in the middle colonies, and most of
the cases that are recorded were presided over by governors or legislatures, and were
granted only for grounds such as adultery and desertion. The southern colonies (Virginia,
Maryland, North and South Carolina) were even more conservative —no divorces were
granted before the American Revolution.12
This disparity between divorce practices in the northern and southern colonies
may have had two basic causes. First, the southern colonies were established primarily
by colonists who followed the Anglican faith with its strong prohibition o f divorce
(Henry VIII notwithstanding). Unlike the Puritans, the southern colonists followed the
English practice of divorce of bed and board only; however, they followed the American
practice o f keeping divorce a civil rather than an ecclesiastical matter.13
Moreover, the unavailability of divorce did not mean, southern marriages were
happy. Formal and informal separations were widespread; spouses "divorced" each other
by publicly repudiating one another's debts and announcing informal separations, and
families with property tried to protect their daughters financially by negotiating pre
marital contracts for them in case their daughters' marriages faded.14

" Phillips, 148-153.
12Riley, 25-29.
13Phillips, 143.
14Riley, 27-28.
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The second reason for the difference in divorce laws between the southern and

northern colonies may lie in the importance each placed on the family as a source of
social stability. William O'Neill has suggested that family patterns may have played a
significant role in this disparity. He proposes that
when families are large and loose, arouse few expectations, and
make few demands, there is no need for divorce. But when families
become the centre o f social organization, their intimacy can become
suffocating, their demands unbearable, and their expectations too
high to become easily realizable. Divorce then becomes the safety
valve that makes the system workable.
Divorce is, therefore, not
an anomaly or a flaw in the system, but an essential feature o f it.15
The flaw with this premise, as Roderick Phillips observes, is that divorces were not
granted during colonial times due to unfulfilled expectations or mutual discontent:
incompatibility or irreconcilable differences were not held as grounds for divorce.
Phillips agrees, however, that there is enough evidence to suggest that family
patterns did have some influence on the issue of divorce policy. The southern colonies,
for instance, held an informal attitude toward families, where common law marriages
occurred frequently, and where new settlements were established first by single men
venturing into new territory with no families at all. In the northern colonies, by contrast,
the puritanical and Protestant Reformation influences put a high value on family
cohesiveness as the basis o f social and political order — families lived in very close
quarters where almost "all important daytime activities were sustained in one room, by

15 William L. O'Neill, Divorce in the Progressive Era (New York, 1963), 6-7
quoted in Phillips, 144.

II
groups comprising six, eight, ten, and even a dozen persons."16 In addition, northern
settlements were mostly comprised o f married couples, to the extent that solitary living
was sometimes forbidden.17
From this short overview, it is obvious that the colonial Puritans' religious
convictions influenced not only American divorce law, but also contributed to one o f the
most important cultural and social changes in Western society: removing divorce from
religious to secular jurisdiction is one o f the major political changes o f the time and
reflects an overall change in political theory throughout the Western civilization.

Revolutionary America
As Whitehead points out, revolutionary America was philosophically preoccupied
with the right to form and disband unions, and the issue of divorce politically and socially
fit within this preoccupation. Consequently, both family and political relationships were
central to the republican thinking of the day. As evidence o f this, the only two m agazines
printed in 1774 and 1775 (Robert Aitken's Pennsylvania Magazine and Isaiah Thomas's
Royal American Magazine) ran frequent articles on the subject o f marriage and divorce.18
Thomas Paine (who had left an unhappy marriage in England) was both editor and

16 John Demos, "Demography and Psychology in the Historical Study o f FamilyLife: A Personal Report," in Peter Laslett and Richard Wall (eds.), Household and
Family in Past Time (Cambridge, 1972), 563 as quoted by Phillips, 145.
17Phillips, 145.
18Whitehead, 15.

frequent contributor to the Pennsylvania Magazine.
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In his article "Reflections on

Unhappy Marriages" published in 1775, Paine argued against marriages based on cold
calculation, advantage, greed or lust and compared these marriages to prostitution. He
also argued that these marriages belonged to the Old World, and that republican
marriages should be unions of the heart, freely chosen by the partners involved and free
o f other interests and claims.19 The republican ideal o f freedom o f choice, however,
extended a type o f conditionality to marriage: if true marriage was based on mutual love
and affection, then the marriage could be disbanded when that love grew cold or
tyrannical.20 In fact, Thomas Paine recommended quite plainly that "we instantly dissolve
the band."21
Even more strongly, the pamphlet An Essay on Marriage, or the Lawfulness o f
Divorce published five years after the Revolutionary War argued that freedom to divorce
was actually an expression o f republican liberty. The writer o f the pamphlet wrote that
America should extend the spirit o f love o f liberty to allow divorce for people "united
together in the worst bondage.”22

19 Thomas Paine, "Reflections on Unhappy Marriages," in Complete Writings o f
Thomas Paine, ed. Philip S. Foner, 2 vols. (New York: Citadel Press, 1945), vol. 2,1119,
quoted in Whitehead, 15.
20Whitehead, 15.
21 Paine, 11120 quoted in Whitehead, 15.
“ Whitehead, 15.
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Although, divorce rates at the end o f the 1700s varied somewhat by region,
divorce laws were liberalized and statistics show a sharp increase in the numbers o f
divorces in the last decade o f the century.23 Nonetheless, marriage breakdown before the
nineteenth century remained extremely rare: economic success depended on conjugal
cooperation, alternatives to marriage were few, and social and religious institutions
created enormous pressure on couples to remain married.24
For the most part, the new states enacted legislation at the end o f the
Revolutionary War similar to or more liberal than the divorce laws in place during the
colonial period. Additionally, the more conservative southern states began to allow
divorce relying on the legislative system o f divorce proceedings in an effort to control
and monitor the rate of divorce. More importantly, however, the middle and northern
states began a shift to judicial divorce (usually by petition to the highest level o f state
courts) as opposed to the colonial system o f legislative divorces (granted by legislative
act).25
This geographic spread o f the availability of divorce and the shift from legislative
to judicial control o f divorce proceedings had an enormous impact on the divorce rates o f

23 Ibid., 17.
24 See Phillips, Chapter 10, "The Social Context o f Marriage Breakdown."
Phillips notes that while divorce, separation and desertion were harder for women, men
also found single or divorced life difficult. Phillips also suggests that the extremely low
rate o f marital breakdown is a reflection o f the low and flexible expectations of marriage:
when expectation is low, tolerance can be correspondingly high for a wide range o f
behavior and conditions that might not be tolerated otherwise.
25Phillips, 154-158.
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the nineteenth century: divorce rates in the United States would soon surpass those o f all
other Western nations.

Divorce In The 1800s
The nineteenth century saw the continued liberalization o f divorce policies and a
progressive expansion of permissible grounds for divorce. Paradoxically, we also see
strong attempts to keep divorce at a minimum through statutory and judicial control.
This parallels our continuing social and cultural commitment to the institution o f
marriage while recognizing the unacceptability of binding couples in perpetual
unhappiness if the marriage goes awry.
Between 1800 and 1850, the northeastern states (with the exception o f New York)
continued to expand the grounds for divorce to include offenses such as extreme cruelty,
a wife's insanity (but not a husband's), imprisonment for a felony, and a spouse's
desertion to join a religious sect that did not believe in sexual relationships.26 In addition,
the northeastern states continued the effort o f disengaging divorce proceedings from
legislative control and codifying the resultant judiciary procedures. New York, however,

26 The latter ground for divorce was in response to the Shaker movement which
held all sexual relations were against divine law. Since celibacy was required o f its
members, a spouse who joined without his or her partner's agreement was technically
guilty o f desertion. The Shaker communities tried to guard against this by only accepting
as members couples in agreement on the issue. Nonetheless, some spouses managed to
join without then mates' consent, and states with Shaker communities began to allow
divorce in these cases. (See Phillips, 441 and Riley, 67-68.)
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steadfastly continued to grant divorce by legislative act alone with, adultery as the sole
ground for divorce.27
At the turn of the century, the southern states (except for South Carolina) began
granting legislative divorces and then gradually moved away from legislative to judicial
divorce proceedings in most states. In general, the southern states enacted laws with
fewer grounds available for obtaining divorce than the northern states had, but by 1860
all the states that would form the Confederacy (with the exception o f South. Carolina) had
adopted policies establishing at a minimum adultery, desertion and cruelty as grounds for
divorce. Taking into consideration that the southern colonies previously had not allowed
any form o f divorce, this seemingly slower progress to liberalize divorce laws is still
comparable to the more progressive trend of the northern states.28
The West and Midwest, on the other hand, provide a sharp contrast to southern
conservatism. Phillips argues that the liberalism of the West and Midwest is in part due
to the fact that these states entered the Union when divorce laws were already being
liberalized in other states (as opposed to having started with more conservative laws).
The specific grounds for divorce were not significantly different in the western states, but
the legislatures were frequently given great latitude in determining cases at then: own
discretion beyond the grounds specified by law. For instance, the 1824 law passed in
Indiana allowed for divorce in any case the court in its discretion found just and

reasonable.

27 Phillips, 444.
28 Ibid., 445-451.
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Along with this judiciary discretion, the West and Midwest frequently had lenient
residency requirements: in Indiana the person filing suit had only to prove residency at
the time of filing the suit; Utah went as far as to allow anyone to file who could show he
or she was a resident or wished to become one! While there was a wide variety o f
differences in the divorce policies o f the western and midwestem states, the broad
discretionary powers accorded the courts allowed for rapid liberalization of laws and even
encouraged the lessening o f severity o f cause in justifying a divorce.29
From the beginning o f the nineteenth century, there had been those who voiced
their concern over liberalizing divorce laws, but a full scale reaction against divorce was
not mounted until after the Civil War. Divorce rates began rising steadily after 1850 with
a sharp increase from 1865 through the end o f the century. This rise in divorce rates set
off alarm bells for conservatives who equated the dissolution o f marriage with the
downfall of society.
In the 1850s, conservative social and political commentators including Horace
Greeley, then editor of the New York Tribune, began expressing concern over the issue of
divorce. Greeley in particular was a vocal opponent of any form o f divorce and used the
Tribune as a pulpit for his arguments.
While debate on divorce became inconsequential during the Civil War, the end. of
the war fanned the flames o f the renewed debate in the late 1860s and 1870s. As
statistics show, divorce rates always rise immediately after a war, and the War Between
the States was no exception. As divorce rates continued to rise, the issue o f divorce

29 Ibid., 451-454.
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became a major part o f the social discussion again —in fact, divorce became "one o f the
first aspects o f what we call the Revolution in Morals to become a matter of public
controversy."30
The fight against divorce was carried on through the work o f social scientists,
organized religion, and social and political commentators — men such as Theodore
Woolsey, retired president o f Yale University, attorney and Doctor o f Divinity. The
pressure created by Woolsey and other clergymen lobbying for divorce reform led to the
formation o f the New England Divorce Reform League in 1881, which became the
National Divorce Reform League in 1885, and the National League for Protection of the
Family in 1897, and was the first organized political opposition to rising divorce rates in
the United States.31
The debate in the 1880s and 1890s centered on familiar themes to those o f us
living in the year 2000: the destruction o f the family unit that is the foundation of our
society, the welfare of children of divorce, the concern o f organized Christian religions
that view divorce as socially destructive and scripturally immoral, and women's rights
advocates concerned that men hold the power to determine and enforce divorce laws that
so greatly affect the lives o f women.32

30O' Neill, vii quoted in Phillips, 461.
31Phillips, 456-461.
32Riley, 108-118.
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Divorce In the Twentieth Century
By the beginning o f the twentieth century, all states except New York and South
Carolina had established liberalized legal processes for divorce available to virtually all
social strata and had thus set the stage for what Whitehead calls the divorce culture o f the
later 1900s. In sum, the twentieth century turned its back on hundreds o f years o f western
tradition: divorce, which had always been marginalized, penalized, and treated as a
deviant social phenomenon, became accepted, expected (statistically at least), and an
integral part o f the pattern o f American familial and cultural lives.
From 1900 to 1920, there were actually few significant changes to the laws
already enacted by the 1890s. This is undoubtedly due in part to the outbreak o f World
War I. The war did, however, have a now predictable effect on divorce rates: the number
o f divorces rose dramatically immediately following the war (from 75,000 divorces in
1910 to over 155,000 in 1920).33
Phillips argues that there are several possible explanations for the increase. First,
the lengthy enforced separation of spouses weakened many marriages. Second, spouses
grew apart because their wartime experiences were so different. Men, for example,
experienced not only the horrors o f war, but also new places and cultures;34 women

33 Phillips, 517. Many of these divorces were undoubtedly sought by couples who
had married hastily at the outset o f the war, but that does not adequately explain such a
dramatic increase in the divorce rate.
34 The popular culture o f the time suggests an awareness o f the idea that these new
experiences might (or did) create new problems. For example, in the World War I song
How You Gonna Keep 'Em Down on the Farm? by Arthur Fields part o f the lyrics read,
"How you gonna keep 'em down on the farm, after they've seen Paree?”
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worked outside the home and gained a new sense o f independence. Third, Phillips
suggests that wartime adultery (possibly a result o f the first two conditions) accounted for
many o f the post-war divorces.3S
The post-war years established a new level o f acceptance o f divorce, and while
divorce rates dropped slightly in 1921 and 1922, they steadily increased from 1922 until
1930.36 Migratory divorce was common for citizens who could not easily obtain a
divorce in their own states — sometimes this meant traveling to France, the Virgin
Islands, Cuba or Mexico, but more often it meant a less exotic trip to Nevada. In fact, the
1920s became the decade o f a virtual divorce trade war between states such as Idaho,
Nevada, Arkansas and Indiana.
These states vied for out-of-state clients by lowering residency requirements and
making inexpensive lodging available. A city where the trade could boom had "a good
railway station, was centrally located, had good shopping and recreational facilities, and
an eager group o f lawyers who courted the divorce trade."37 The competition, however,
was not an endeavor to see who could enact the most liberalized residency laws, but more
a case of economic expediency: the trade from out-of-state clients provided a lucrative

3SPhillips, 519-522.
35 Constance Ahrons, The Good Divorce (Harper Collins Publishers, New York,
1994), 28.
37Ibid.
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income for theses states —an income that would become even more attractive, during the
depression years o f the 1930s.38
After the stock market crash in October, 1929, the divorce rates declined in the
United States for the fist time in ten years. From 1930 to 1933, divorce rates fell by
twenty percent compared to the rate in 1929. This drop in divorces can be attributed to
factors influenced by economics: women's employment opportunities decreased, thereby
making divorce less feasible for them; couples could not afford to get married and
marriages declined by thirteen percent during this time; and couples who had separated
did not seek divorce because they could not afford to remarry (making a divorce
unnecessary). By 1934, however, divorce rates began to rise again and by 1936 surpassed
the pre-Depression rate.39
The onset o f World War H had little effect on the divorce rate, but the post-war
years saw an unprecedented increase. Most likely, the same factors that caused the
increase in divorces after World War 1 were at work after World War H. Also, as in the
1920s after World War I, divorce rates declined somewhat and stabilized in the 1950s.
Unlike the 1920s, however, the decade from 1950 to I960 saw very little increase in the
divorce rate for the first time in nearly a century.
The stability of divorce rates in the 1950s may be explained by several social,
economic and political factors. Post-war society entered a period o f social conservatism.
Families and marriage were held in higher esteem by society probably in reaction to the

38 Phillips, 530-533.
39 Ibid., 553-555.
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exigencies o f the war following close on the heels o f the Depression. Also, the nation
enjoyed a period o f great prosperity and economic boom. Finally, legislation changed so
little, that there was not even the usual rise in rates due to liberalization o f laws.40
Stephanie Coontz suggests that the strong pro-family sentiment and the great
economic improvement combined to make a powerful (if short-lived) cultural shift
Not only was the 1950s family a new invention, it was also a historical
fluke, based on a unique and temporary conjuncture of economic, social,
and political factors. During the war, Americans had saved at a rate more
than three times higher than that in the decades before or since. Their
buying power was further enhanced by America’s extraordinary
competitive advantage at the end o f the war, when every other industrial
power was devastated by the experience.41
As evidence that these factors worked in concert, she cites the purchases o f appliances
and household furnishings that rose by two hundred and forty percent following World
War II, and the fact that nearly the entire increase in the gross national product in the
mid-1950s was attributable to residential building and consumer durable goods.42
In addition, Coontz suggests that emotionally, people were putting "their mouths
where their money was” —the majority o f people responding to a 1955 marriage study
said they gave up "nothing" in being married, and less than ten percent believed that

40 Ibid., 555-561.
41 Stephanie Coontz, The Wav We Never were: American Families and the
Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, Harper Collins Publishers, Inc., 1992), 28.
42Ibid.
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single persons could be happy. Coontz quotes a popular advice book as stating, "The
family is the center o f your living. If it isn't, you've gone far astray."43
This advice is indicative o f the mood o f the 1950s. Tremendous social pressure
was brought to bear on both men and women to live by this precept A pseudo-Victorian
revival of separate spheres occurred: the real difference being that Victorian women were
responsible for the moral realm of the home, while their 1950s counterparts were
responsible for what amounted to personal service. Victorian women with even modest
means left housework to servants — 1950s housewives regardless o f their means were
expected to cook, clean and be cheerfully attentive to their husbands’ needs.44
Men also were pressured into new roles: men belonged married and at home (not
single, and certainly not out with the guys); they were supposed to control the behavior
and attitudes o f their families; and frequently, promotions depended on the suitability o f a
man's marriage, i.e., the suitability o f his wife. Coontz points out that all of this laid the
groundwork for tremendous familial conflict that was internalized due to the perceived
lack of divorce as an option and was most likely a major factor in the tremendous rise in
divorce rates in the late 1960s.45
Beginning in 1959, the divorce rate began climbing again, and by 1968, the rate
was increasing by up to twelve percent a year. By 1974, the rate o f increase per year

43 Ibid., 25.
44 Coontz uses as an example the public relations releases for Joan Crawford
showing the star mopping her own floors.
45Ibid., 27-29.
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slowed, but it was not until 1982 that the divorce rate decreased slightly,46 The reasons
for the increase are consistent with previous rises in the divorce rate: women's economic
independence, cultural attitudes in the form o f marital expectations, and legal reform.
The first two apply to the sharp increases from 1960 to 1968. The depression and
the war profoundly affected marital expectations after World War EL It has been argued
that through the years o f economic deprivation, Americans internalized a strong
commitment to family combined with low material expectations — many o f them had
quite likely despaired of ever marrying. These people subscribed to (and perhaps created)
the cultural shift with its focus on marriage and family —they regarded their marriages as
something to protect and maintain.
During the 1950s, however, women paradoxically began entering the work force
in unprecedented numbers.

Coontz argues that during this period o f reasserted

domesticity for wives, women returned to work in response to growing economic factors.
As demand for labor outstripped supply, and with so many men remaining in military
service, barriers to women workers fell and wages paid to women rose. By I960, forty
percent o f all women worked —and increasingly these women stated that they worked for
reasons o f self-esteem as well as economic need.47
Phillips argues that throughout western history, women's employment is one of
the most significant factors in the rise o f divorce rates. He suggests this is so because
women's employment affects several marital conditions.

46 Phillips, 560.
47Coontz, 160-161.

It not only provides an
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economic avenue of escape for women in marriages that have broken down, but it also
may facilitate divorce for men who financially could not afford two households.
Additionally, employment outside the home may contribute to the actual breakdown o f a
marriage that otherwise might survive. Women who work, for the most part, continue to
bear all or nearly all of the burden o f maintaining their homes which creates even more
stress that can contribute significantly to marital discord. Phillips further points out that
by I960, many women were working to pay for the extras or luxuries o f life —not just for
the necessities such as food and shelter,48 and Coontz reminds us that the late 1950s set
the scene for the runaway indebtedness of the 1970s and 1980s —it was the beginning of
the era o f the two-wage family.49
This change in material expectations in the marriage has paralleled a
corresponding rise in the importance o f affection in the marriage -- an increasing focus on
the couple’s emotional relationship. Evidence o f this can be found in the ever mounting
numbers o f self-help books (for example, Men Are from Mars and Women Are from
Venus) stressing communication, understanding each other's needs and improving sexual
relations within the marriage. Phillips argues that these are concerns that in the past were
associated with pre- or extra-marital affairs, and that the traditionally held expectation o f
a "slide from intense passion to comfortable companionship after the initial years o f

48 Phillips, 621-622.
49 Coontz, 37-38.
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married life"50 has become less than acceptable and possibly contributes to the stresses
that can lead to marital breakdown.
After 1968, however, the tremendous rise in divorce rates can also be correlated
with the reform in divorce law. It is apparent that during the 1960s, Americans changed
their attitudes about divorce - in fact, surveys show that the attitude toward liberalizing
divorce occurred faster than the divorce law reform. This attitudinal change appears to
have occurred primarily between 1968 and 1974 —coincidental with sweeping divorce
policy reforms and the greatest phase o f increase in the divorce rate.51

50 Phillips, 623.
51Phillips, 623-627.

CHAPTER 3

NO-FAULT DIVORCE

Until the 1970s, traditional marriages in the United States and other western
cultures were viewed as contracts wherein both husbands and wives had legal obligations
that were specified in various forms of law. These laws reinforced the responsibilities o f
both parties, rewarding those who fulfilled their marital obligations and punishing
spouses who did not.1
Despite the gradual liberalization o f divorce laws, the traditional fault-based
divorce law, which prevailed in the United States until California's landmark reform in
1969, sought to maintain this traditional family relationship by making it difficult for
spouses to obtain a divorce. This meant that traditional western law reinforced and
helped define the roles and responsibilities o f a traditional legal marriage. In her book
The Divorce Revolution:

The Unexpected Social and Economic Consequences for

Women and Children in America, Lenore J. Weitzman points out that these roles and
responsibilities were gender-based in a patriarchal family structure that had a moral
framework and presumed a lifelong commitment to the marital partnership.
1 Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free
Press, 1985), I.

26

27
To obtain a divorce under traditional divorce law it was rarely enough to
demonstrate that the marriage was dead — that both parties agreed to irreconcilable
differences or simply had made a mistake and agreed that they wanted out o f the
marriage. Under traditional law, spouses had to establish that one or the other o f them
was solely responsible for the death o f the marriage.

In addition, grounds for divorce

were limited to a few kinds of marital fault, usually adultery, cruelty, drunkenness or
desertion.

Proponents o f traditional divorce law saw these obstacles to divorce as

representing society's "valid interest in promoting family stability, pointing to statistics
correlating broken homes with higher crime rates and increased welfare payments, as well
as less tangible moral values."2
In any event, traditional divorce laws laid a moral framework o f guilt or
innocence; divorce was a means for the innocent to obtain redress from the guilty. In
fact, many states carried this to the extent that unless the party seeking the divorce was
entirely blameless or innocent, neither party would be granted the divorce. Presumably,
this approach precluded the court from rewarding anyone with "dirty hands."3
Consequently, financial awards at the dissolution o f a marriage were also linked
to innocence or guilt; in other words, alimony was awarded to an innocent spouse as a
"judgement against the guilty spouse."4 And because traditional divorce laws reinforced
the traditional roles o f marriage, women stayed home and raised children, and men

2Wheeler, 2-8.
3 Ibid., 10.
4 Ibid., 12.
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supported them -- even in divorce. This meant that men usually paid alimony subsequent
to a divorce, and women almost always were awarded custody of the children.
Weitzman concludes that traditional divorce law reinforced the traditional
marriage through reward and punishment. Wives who committed adultery, cruelty or
desertion would be denied alimony; husbands would be punished through awards of
property, alimony and child support to the wife.

Justice in this system was the

"assurance that the marriage contract would be honored."5
Unfortunately, this system thrust an already unpleasant situation into an
inescapably adversarial confrontation as well as often inducing flagrant perjury so that
someone could be judged guilty and someone innocent. In his book No-Fault Divorce.
Michael Wheeler quotes Monrad Paulsen o f the University of Virginia Law School, "The
necessity o f proving a ground o f divorce such as adultery, cruelty, or desertion leads to
the most flagrant collusion and outright fraud on part o f divorce seeking couples."6 This
policy often resulted in one or both parties committing perjury and, as we shall see, led in
part to the establishment o f no-fault divorce laws.
The 1960s heralded an era o f liberalizing changes in Western society and
especially the United States. This was the decade of the civil rights movement; the war in
Vietnam and its tremendous opposition from the youth of America; the beginning of a
strong feminist movement that would challenge the social and political dominance o f
men in the 1970s; liberalized attitudes toward sex and birth control; and even the Roman
Catholic Church (a bastion o f staid traditions) gave way to the progressive forces o f
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society with, sweeping changes as a result of the 21st Ecumenical Council (Vatican II). In
short, authorities, governments and institutions responded to the social pressure by
liberalizing many policies —including divorce laws.
According to Roderick Phillips, Western society in the 1960s reevaluated not only
divorce laws, but the institution o f marriage itself. He argues that the introduction o f no
fault divorce laws was the "result of a long debate about the character o f marriage and the
functions of marriage law.” He further argues that the social scientific approach to marriage
and divorce shifted the emphasis from individual responsibility for success or failure of a
marriage to an analysis o f "causal or predisposing conditions in society at large."7 This
cultural shift was not endemic to the United States alone and bears out Philips’ contention
that marriage itself has not changed so much as the context of marriage has. As Table 3.1
shows, most western nations made overhauling changes to their long-standing divorce
policies between 1960 and 1980.
While Table 1 shows only the dates for changes in California and New York in
the United States, all fifty states adopted reform at varying times from 1967 (New York)
to 1985 (South Dakota).® The California reform, however, was the first true no-fault
reform in the United States, and a discussion o f its adoption and the consequences o f its
implementation can serve as a good example o f the divorce reform movement o f the
1960s and 1970s.

7Phillips, 565-566.
* Ibid., 562.
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Table 1 -- Divorce Law Reform, 1960-1981
®^sea^oBreasM ioiE
1961/1976

West Germany

Major reform/complete revision

1963/1980

New Zealand

Complete revisions

1967

New York State

Complete revision

1968

Canada

First federal divorce law

1969

England and Wales

Complete revision

1969

Denmark

Major reform

1969

Finland

Major reform

1969

Norway

Major reform

1969

California

Complete revision

1970

Italy

Divorce legalized

1971

Netherlands

Complete revision

1983

Sweden

Complete revision

1974

Belgium

Major reform

1975

Australia

Complete revision

1975

France

Complete revision

1975

Italy

Major reform

1976

Scotland

Complete revision

1977

Portugal

Complete revision

1978

Austria

Major reform

Source: Roderick Phillips, Putting Asunder A History of Divorce in Western Society
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 566.
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The California Initiative
When California passed its divorce reform law in 1969, the United States became
the first nation in the Western world to support unilateral, no-fault divorces. The divorce
law reform that started in California actually began as an effort to reduce the adversarial
nature o f divorce proceedings inherent in a one-party-is-guilty system and to eliminate
the hypocrisy and outright perjury required o f couples who lied under oath in order to
find one party guilty and the other innocent.9 As evidenced by the fact that every other
state in the Union followed suit by adopting no-fault divorce laws within 15 years,
California's concerns were probably representative o f many o f the concerns felt by
society at large - further bearing out Phillips’ arguments for a cultural shift in our views
on marriage and divorce. In fact within four years o f the California reform, thirty-six
states had adopted no-fault divorce laws. Ironically, South Dakota was the last state to
adopt no-fault divorce laws in 1985 —its frontier divorce mill days notwithstanding.10
The most troublesome aspects of the traditional fault-based divorce laws were: I)
the adversarial environment, 2) child custody, 3) awards o f child support, and 4) awards
o f alimony and the division o f property." In themselves, however, these problems were
not enough to trigger what can loosely be termed the divorce movement. Instead, the

9 Wheeler, 14- 20. Ostensibly, Governor Brown appointed his Commissiott on the
Family to revise the divorce laws in California to help stem the rising divorce rate, but
clearly, the emphasis from the legislature was to eliminate the hypocrisy and perjury. This
is most evident in the legislature ignoring the recommendations o f the commission to
institute family and marital counseling provisions as part o f the reform adopted in 1970.
10 Herbert Jacob, "Women and Divorce Reform," in Women. Politics, and Change,
(The Russell Sage Foundation, 1990), 483.
u Ibid.
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four major themes that set the reform in California in motion were: 1) the high divorce
rates, 2) the adversarial process, 3) the need to recognize the inevitability o f divorce, and
4) the strong reaction o f divorced men who charged that "the divorce law and its
practitioners were in league with divorced wives to suck the blood, not to mention the
money, o f former husbands."12
It is interesting to note that the instrumental call for change in California divorce
law was made by then-Govemor Edmund Brown.

Governor Brown appointed the

Governor's Commission on the Family which was a bipartisan group of professionals
(lawyers, judges, law professors, politicians and others).13 Governor Brown appointed
the commission to proceed in a "concentrated assault on the high incidence o f divorce
and its tragic consequences” in an attempt to right the social and economic ills o f divorce,
namely juvenile delinquency, crime, alcoholism, and welfare dependency.14
Even after the California example, divorce policy reform in the rest o f the states
occurred with no structured or self-conscious policy reform movement. That is not to
say, however, that the reform happened void o f interest group participation. According
to Herbert Jacob in his essay "Women and Divorce Reform" published in Women.
Politics, and Change, the most active groups were lawyers, men's rights groups, and the
Catholic Church.IS

a Weitzman, 16-17.
13Wheeler, 19.
14Weitzman, 18.
15Jacob, 495.
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Lawyers
Divorce reform, legislation proposals were often initiated by individual lawyers or
the organized bar, and most legislatures asked the bar in their states for opinions on the
proposed legislation. Adding to their expertise in family law and access to legislatures,
many lawyers also served in state legislatures, frequently monopolizing positions on
judiciary committees. All these circumstances put together made (and make) lawyers a
very influential group as states considered divorce reform.16
Also, it should not go unnoticed that family lawyers have a vested economic
interest in the divorce laws o f their states. Jacob cites the fact that the 1980 revision of
property division laws in the state o f New York was in the bar’s economic interest. The
reform "spurred an enormous amount o f litigation that made divorce expensive for many
clients and remunerative for many attorneys.”17
Wheeler holds a similarly jaundiced view of the motives and even of the ability of
lawyers involved in reforming divorce laws. From the perspective o f the late 1960s and
early 1970s, he quotes Robert Drinan, a previous editor o f Family Law Quarterly as
writing:
Despite the basic unsuitability of America's present divorce procedure,
borrowed from the ecclesiastical courts, little if any imagination has been
exercised in the creation of a better process. The fact is that the American bench
and bar have never really been interested in the law o f domestic relations.
Lawyers have tended to avoid divorce cases and have allowed a "divorce bar" to
grow up in each metropolitan area. Similarly judges, at least until very recently,
have acquiesced in the fact that the divorce court enjoys the least prestige o f all
the courts.18
16Ibid., 496.
17Ibid.
18Wheeler, 134.
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Men's Rights Groups
Although. lawyers and the bar had more influence with the state legislatures, men's
rights groups were still very active from the beginning (as early as 1964 in California),
and many testified before state legislatures though there is litde evidence that they were
taken seriously before the 1980s.19 According to Wheeler, many o f the men's rights
groups were considered "borderline kooks" which could have had a lot to do with their
lack of influence. He recounts the story o f Paul Hansen, the founder o f Fathers United
for Equal Rights in Maryland, who received national publicity for picketing in front of a
church attended by a Baltimore judge. Hansen wore nothing but a wooden barrel and his
underwear and carried signs that read, "This Could Happen to You" and "Judge McGuire
Repent." Hansen's group complained about alimony and the difficulty fathers had in
obtaining custody of their children. His opinion o f the system was, "The laws stink, the
lawyers are putrid, and the judges are so slow to change.1'20 In addition to his theatrics,
Hansen's unflattering language could not have endeared him or his cause to the influential
lawyers, bar, judges and legislators o f Maryland.
Men's rights groups were very successful, however, in pressing for reform o f the
custody laws in the 1980s. These groups made intuitively appealing arguments for joint
custody, and even though they were not nationally organized and had relatively low
membership, they prevailed by focusing on the narrow issue of child custody.21

19Jacob, 496.
20 Wheeler, 137.
21 Jacob, 496-497.
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The Roman Catholic Church
Like men's rights groups, the Catholic Church achieved some success by narrowly
focusing its interests, but unlike lawyers or men's rights groups, the church took a
defensive rather than an offensive position. As a matter o f doctrine, all divorce is
unacceptable to the Catholic Church, and it tried (in some cases successfully) to prevent
divorce reforms from going through.
Because the Catholic Church is not really the monolithic entity that some suppose
(at least not in the United States), and because the situations were different in each state,
the church did not have a universal approach to divorce reform. Additionally, the church
did not have easy access to legislatures as did lawyers and men's rights groups, but its
influence was felt in states with large Catholic populations because many o f the
legislators in these states were Catholic. In addition, the church had lobbyists in state
capitals, and it used the pulpit to deliver its message to parishioners.
In some states, however, the Catholic Church provided little resistance and in
some cases actively supported divorce reform. In California, for example, the divorce
laws were already so liberal that the church had no vested interest in maintaining a status
quo. Additionally, the Governor's Commission was ostensibly charged with reforming
the divorce laws to stem the high rate o f divorces, something the church viewed as a
definite improvement. Consequently, there was at least tacit approval by the church o f
the divorce reform in that state.22

22Wheeler, 146-150.

36
So, while the church's principles may have seemed unshakable, it often made
compromises and in the end had little effect on the eventual outcome o f divorce reform.
The notable exceptions were the effects of its efforts in some of the states with large
Catholic populations: New York never explicitly embraced no-fault, and no-fault reform
came late to Wisconsin (1977), Pennsylvania (1980), and Illinois (1983).23
As a final observation, the women’s movement was conspicuously absent as a
major contributor in the reform of divorce — especially since divorce reform occurred
during a period o f intense feminist activity that reached a peak during the 1970s.
According to Herbert Jacob, some of the apparent disinterest on the part o f feminist
groups can be attributed to the lack of influence o f women in state legislatures. Jacob
contends that while the feminist movement made a strong impression during this tune on
the American public through the mass media, it did not penetrate to all levels of the
policy making process and that "to claim a voice in divorce law change, feminists needed
continuous representation in state capitals, a requirement which the fledgling movement
could not m eet"24

The Unexpected Consequences
The divorce law reform that started out in California to contain the rising rate o f
divorce, and to "rid the divorce process o f its anachronistic moral elements and reduce the
acrimony, hostility, perjury and hypocrisy that pervaded the divorce process under the old

23Jacob, 497.
24Ibid., 490.
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law,"25 has had some unexpected outcomes over the last thirty years. These unexpected
outcomes have been most evident in terms o f the economic and moral consequences o f
post-no-fault divorce reform.
In discussing the results of the divorce law reform, it is helpful to look at the
intended outcomes o f the changes to the law. Lenore J. Weitzman used the comparisons
in Table 2 to illustrate the differences between traditional and no-fault divorce laws.26
The fault-based laws were restrictive, pro-marriage laws with specific grounds for
divorce that were based on a moral framework, required one party to be at fault, and
could not be sought unilaterally.

The change to no-fault was almost a complete

turnaround: no-fault laws facilitate divorce, require no grounds, have an administrative
rather than a moral framework (no guilt or innocence), and can be undertaken by either
party without the other’s consent. This “administrative” quality o f no-fault leads to
gender-neutral decisions that leave both parties responsible for self-support, both eligible
for custody, and both responsible for child support as opposed to the traditional role
based decisions in which fathers pay alimony and child support, and wives get custody o f
the children.
This comparison helps us understand how the reform was perceived as equitable
to all parties and advantageous in eliminating adversarial proceedings (as well as
perjury). It also helps identify the areas that were impacted most by the changes: the
economic status o f women and their children (gender-neutral responsibilities and
financial awards based on equality) and the moral trap tacitly expressed in no-fault

25Weitzman, 51.
26 Ibid., 40.
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proceedings whereby either spouse can leave at will and without cause —a situation that
clearly undermines the individual responsibility and obligation incurred in a marriage.27
Economically, the issue is relatively clean cut —women and children have been
most hurt by the equal division o f property and by the lack o f alimony or adequate child
support perpetuated by the new laws. While the "equal" division of property suggests
fairness and equity, it does not necessarily bring equal results to all parties in a divorce.

Table 2 —Summary o f Changes in Divorce Law

Traditional Divorce

No-Fanlt Divorce

Restrictive Law - pro-marriage

Permissive Law - facilitates divorce

Specific Grounds

No Grounds

Moral Framework

Administrative Framework

Fault

No fault

Consent of Innocent Spouse Needed

No Consent Needed

Gender-based Responsibilities

Gender-neutral Responsibilities

Financial Awards Linked to Fault

Financial Awards Based on Equality and
Need

Adversarial

Nonadversarial

Source: r.ennre J. Weityman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free
Press, 1985), 40.

As Weitzman points out, it can hardly be considered equitable to force the sale of
the family assets (especially a home) so that the proceeds can be shared between the

27 Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: American in Search o f a Public
Philosophy, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press, 1996), 110.
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spouses when, the sale o f the assets means disruption and sometime dislocation m the
lives o f minor children. This method o f distributing property equally between the
spouses belies the fact that the average family consists o f four people, not two. Under
this rule, three people (the children and custodial parent, usually the wife) share one-half
o f the property while the non-custodial parent (usually the husband) receives one-half all
for him or herself.28
One way to avoid the sale o f the custodial home is for the custodial parent to
"trade" an equally valuable asset for the home. The drawback to this solution is that
many if not most women who are custodial parents have no assets to trade —frequently,
the family home is the only real asset a couple owns. Another alternative is for women to
trade the amount o f child support or alimony the court might award them. Unfortunately,
many women cannot live without the awarded support, so they are forced to sell the
home.29
To compound the issue o f equal treatment with unequal results, child support
awards are low, and the awarded amount is rarely the same as the amount women actually
receive.30 As Michael Sandel points out, no-fault divorce law fails to respect traditional
roles and penalizes mothers and homemakers who have lived their married lives as
"situated selves" —whose identities were constituted by their roles. These women have
depended on their husbands for economic support and in return cared for children and

28Weitzman, 104.
29 Ibid., 79-80.
30Ibid., 265; also see Phillips, 628.
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home so that their husbands could pursue their careers. When the marriage breaks up,
however, the husband still has his career while she has the care o f the children and the
necessity of finding employment — many times without the benefit of marketable job
skills.31
In practice, this means that women and children frequently experience a
significant decrease in their standard o f living. Women typically are left with half o f the
marital property (amounting to less than $10,000 on average), no alimony, child support
they may never receive and custody o f the children.32 Weitzman's research shows that
after only one year o f divorce, "Men experience a 42 percent improvement in their post
divorce standard o f living while women experience a 73 percent decline." Weitzman
points out that these data indicate a financial catastrophe for women who must then deal
with "severe deprivation: every single expenditure that one takes for granted —clothing,
food, housing, heat — must be cut to one-half or one-third o f what one is accustomed
to."33
Although Weitzman's study has been criticized as being too narrowly focused,
and other studies have shown the economic consequences to be considerably less dire, the
fact remains that children and their mothers suffer disastrous economic setbacks in
divorce. For example, forty percent o f all children eligible for child support have no legal

31 Sandel, 114.
32Ibid.
33Weitzman, 339.
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child support awarded to them,34while those children who do receive child support do not
fare that much better when one considers that the average annual child support obligation
in the United States is $3,000.00. The median male salary, on the other hand, is $30,000
annually35 —even after taxes, fathers o f intact families have considerably more income
than $3,000.00 per year to invest in their children's behalf.
In addition, studies such as those conducted by Judith Wallerstein and Sandra
Blakeslee show that children of divorce are more at risk o f dropping out o f school,
suffering emotional problems such as low self-esteem and alienation, and abusing alcohol
and drugs.36 Although some studies report statistics that show a lesser degree o f negative
impact on women and children o f divorce, all o f the findings indicate that in divorce,
women and children are the losers.
While this economic "catastrophe" can be seen as a direct result o f striving for
equality under the no-fault divorce laws, it is perhaps even more a result of the new laws
giving way to moral-blind grounds for divorce. Both the moral framework o f the old
divorce laws and the gender-based responsibilities o f married partners protected women
in the past from the kind of destitution that divorce brings to them and their children
today.

34 Sara McLanahan and Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994), 2.
35 "Money Income o f Households, Families and Persons in the United States: 1990
Bureau o f the Census, Current Population Reports, Consumer Income, Series P-60, No. 174
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, August 1991) quoted by Whitehead,
155.
36 Judith Wallerstein and Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men. Women and
Children a Decade After Divorce (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1989).

CHAPTER 4

SOME ETHICAL APPROACHES TO MARRIAGE,
CHILDREN AND DIVORCE

It is clear that in today's society, divorce has been transformed from a last resort
into an acceptable, common response to marriage breakdown. This attitude toward
marriage (reflected in no-fault divorce laws) is a direct result o f the shifts in religious,
ethical, political and socio-economic conditions that affect the family, marital
expectations and our responses to marriage breakdown. This leads Phillips to argue that
marriage has become less stable over time "not primarily because of changes in the
emotional content o f marriage but rather because the social context of marriage has been
transformed."1
Furthermore, Sandel notes that the provisions for unilateral divorces, the concept of
gender-neutral roles and the emphasis on self-sufficiency after divorce "reflect the liberal
conception of persons as unencumbered selves independent o f their roles and unbound by
moral ties they choose to rqect."2 This all leads one to conclude that the high rate o f
divorce and the lack of commitment to provide even minimal child support much less

1Phillips, 640.
2 Sandel, 112.
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alimony may be linked at least in part to our cultural propensity to insist on individual rights
without an accompanying sense of duty or responsibility.
This is a great cultural leap from the attitudes on divorce during most of our 200year history. To better understand the process o f how our cultural attitudes changed so
dramatically in such a relatively short span o f time, it is helpful to look at how the ethical
theories affecting early America before the Revolutionary War shaped our political
processes o f the time, and at the two major influences on Western thought, namely
utilitarianism and deontological theories, that have strongly impacted and changed the way
in which people have viewed their rights and obligations in the two hundred years since the
revolution. An understanding o f these last are essential to crafting public policies that can
better deflect the negative consequences o f divorce.

Early Influences
In addition to Puritanical influences, American political theories played a big part
in liberalizing the divorce laws of the 1700s. The secularization o f divorce proceedings
in colonial America is evidence of a long-term trend in the secularization o f political
attitudes and theories in western cultures. This turning away from the Bible for political
and legal guidance was a result in particular o f the legal, political and social theories
advanced by proponents of natural law and contract philosophies.3 These theories
contributed significantly to the political birth o f the United States and to the formation of
our policies, laws and attitudes toward divorce.

3 Phillips, 210.
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Gradually during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, western political
theories and philosophies began to deviate from the religious assumptions o f medieval
times. At the end o f the sixteenth century, many found themselves weary o f religious
strife that had left them with incipient disbelief in Catholicism and Protestantism both. In
addition, the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation had well prepared the
intellectual and political thinkers of the day for a change.

The Renaissance had

celebrated human achievements and inspired a renewed interest in the humanism o f
classical Greece. The Protestant Reformation created new perspectives on how religion
could interact with economics, politics and cultural attitudes. These shifts in thinking
during the sixteenth century allowed political thought to move toward the theories o f
natural law and social contract —the seventeenth century became a time o f transition.4
Although this paper cannot encompass a detailed history o f natural law and
contract philosophies, it is important to understand the role these emerging theories o f the
period played in shaping our current laws and attitudes toward divorce.

In brief,

philosophers o f natural law developed theories based on nature and reason rather than on
biblical or religious teachings. Also (and o f particular interest to divorce law), most
natural law theorists came to support the principle of contract whereby a contractual
obligation was binding only if both parties entered into it freely. In a social context, then,
it became easy to see how the institution o f marriage fits the definition o f a civil contract,

4 For concise overviews of the impact of the thinkers and philosophers in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Abraham Edel, Elizabeth Flower and Finbarr W.
O'Connor, eds., Morality, Philosophy, and Practice: Historical and Contemporary
Readings and Studies (New York: Random House, 1989), Chapter 7, "Stirrings o f the
Modem Age,” 163-174, and Kagan, Chapter 18, "New Directions in Science and Thought
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries," 463-487.
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and it was not a far step to then allow divorce —a subsequent civil action in the case o f
failure to deliver on the part o f either spouse.
Early proponents o f natural law such as Hugo Grotius tried to interpret natural
law within the parameters o f the Bible to proscribe divorce except in biblical terms.
However, later philosophers such as John Locke relied strictly on nature and reason in
developing arguments for allowing divorce.5 It is interesting to note that one can first
find references to children in the matter o f divorce in seventeenth century works. Earlier
theological based writing on marriage and divorce referred to children as the
procreational obligation o f the marriage. In contrast, natural law with its focus on duty
stressed the parental obligation, both during marriage and in the event o f divorce, to the
children the marriage produced.6
In addition to secularizing the law, the turn to natural law in the seventeenth
century led to a shift of emphasis that focused more on natural rights. We clearly see the
results o f this shift in the seventeenth century where the distinction between natural law
and natural rights is evident in the political rhetoric o f the day. Natural law is a system
based on God’s universal prescription for all people and individual rights and duties are
found within this context.

Natural rights, by contrast, are primary rights — every

individual is endowed with them. Moral questions in natural law are analyzed with a
focus on duties or obligations.

Natural rights theories focus on the rights of the

individual rather than on his or her obligations.

5 Phillips, 210-214.
6 Ibid., 214.
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By the end o f the 1600s, the distinction between natural law and natural rights had
crystallized, and modem political theory was being built upon i t Part of the reason for
the shift in thinking may have come from the translation o f the word ins orju s which can
mean both "law" and "right" There is no evidence that ins in the thirteenth century was
ever translated as a right that one could possess. However, between the thirteenth and
seventeenth centuries, a shift began to take place in how the word ins was translated.
Through this time frame, ins "shifts from 'the just thing itself (Aquinas), to 'power1
(Ockham), then to 'ability' (Gerson and Suarez), then to 'quality' (Grotius), and finally, to
liberty (Hobbes)."7
Thomas Hobbes, in fact, came to build a modem political theory on this
difference:
The names lex and ius, that is to say, law and right, are often confounded,
and yet scarce are there two words o f more contrary signification. For
right is that liberty that law leaves us; and laws those restraints by which
we agree mutually to abridge one another's liberty.8
This focus on rights became a fundamental premise for framers o f the Constitution and
has had a great influence on the development o f the American culture.

Rights-Based, Duty-Based and Goals-Based Theories
The real dilemma in crafting an acceptable, uniform divorce policy is not in convincing
the American public that the welfare o f our children is at stake. Rather, the dilemma is

7 Edel et al., eds., 109. For an in-depth discussion o f this transition, Edel
recommends Richard Tuck, Natural Rights Theories: Then Origin and Development

(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), and John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), chapter 8.
8 Thomas Hobbes, Elements o f Law II, 10 quoted in Edel et al., 108.
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one of balancing the responsibility or duty to one’s children with one’s right as an
individual to divorce. Over the last two hundred years, deontological and utilitarian
theories have dramatically reshaped how the American culture views rights and
responsibilities, and importantly for this discussion, on the different ways we judge
whether an action is moral or not. Understanding the distinction between rights-based,
duty-based and goal-based rights and their underlying theories of ethics (primarily
deontological and utilitarian theories), then, is essential to devising a uniform divorce
policy that is acceptable to the broadest spectrum o f our society.
According to Jeremy Waldron, Ronald Dworlrin first made the distinction
between rights-based, duty-based and goal-based theories in the 1970s. Dworkin holds
that theories o f political morality are based on requirements to act or refrain from acting
in a given set o f circumstances, and the bases of differing political theories are
determined by how the requirements are generated and justified.

From this point o f

view, political moral theories can be categorized as rights-, duty- or goal-based.9
To illustrate the differences, Waldron uses the paradigm o f a requirement for
police and others to refrain from torturing individuals.

If we subscribe to this

requirement because we believe no one should have to endure that kind of suffering, we
are working from a rights-based theory (derived from the duty to hold each person as an
end not a means). If we think the requirement is justified because torturing others
debases the torturer, then we are working from a duty-based (deontological) theory.

9 Jeremy Waldron, ed., Theories o f Rights, (New York: Oxford University Press,
Inc., 1984), 12. Waldron points out it is difficult to hold a rights-based view if one’s having
a right is correlated with someone else’s duty—how can some theories be rights-based and
others duty-based? Waldron recommends that a better definition o f rights for this purpose is
“individual interests.”
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Finally, a goals-based (e.g., utilitarian) theory in this paradigm would view the torture
unacceptable only in the light of the impact o f the torture on the aggregate o f those
having an interest (did the torture, for instance, provide a benefit to society that
outweighed the pain to the individual).10

Deontological Influences
In the last half o f the eighteenth and first part o f the nineteenth centuries,
deontological and utilitarian theories emerged in Europe as the two most significant
theories of modem Western ethics. Both of these theories, though very different in
approach, emerged as people began to question the traditional Western assumptions that
morality must come from a natural (or religious) source outside o f man. The move away
from this traditional view to a belief that the source for morality arises from within
human nature led to a view that human beings could understand morality in terms o f selfgovemance or autonomy rather than morality being imposed on human beings.11
Deontological thought is an ethics o f duty by which morality is based on specific,
foundational principles o f obligations. It is based on the idea that human beings clearly
have certain obligations in life, such as the care o f their children and not to commit
murder. These theories follow the premise that the moral person must act on the
principles of obligation regardless o f the consequences of those actions. In simple terms,
deontological theories are based on the input rather than the outcome of actions.

10Ibid., 12-14.
11 J. B. Schneewind, “Modem Moral Philosophy,” A Companion to Ethics, ed.
Peter Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), 147.
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Immanuel Kant, whose work in the 1780s and 1790s revolutionized all branches
o f thought,12 gives us a deontological theory in which moral action is judged by
examining the nature o f the action and the will of the agent This derivation o f moral
law from the will o f the agent lays the foundation for moral autonomy. Influenced by
Grotius and Pufendorf, Kant agreed that moral duties include duties to oneself and others,
but he also argued that there is a single, self-evident principle of reason that would stand
as a categorical imperative - the foundation for all other ethical judgment

Kant

developed his discussion o f ethics around the question, “What ought I do?” and he was
concerned primarily with identifying the maxims or fundamental principles o f action that
one ought to adopt
In answering the question “what ought I do,” Kant held that only maxims or
principles that could be adopted by a plurality o f persons could serve as moral
principles.13 This categorical imperative, known as the Formula o f Universal Law, is the
keystone to Kantian ethics; for Kant, principles that are not universalizable must be
rejected. The Formula of Universal Law is most often quoted as: “Act only on the
maxim through which you can at the same time will that it be a universal law.”14
The categorical imperative most commonly recognized and that has had the most
cultural impact, however, is the Formula o f the End in Itself. This formula demands that
one treat “humanity in your own person or in the person of any other never simply as a

12Edel etal., 276-277.
13 Onora O’Neill, “Kantian Ethics,” A Companion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer
(Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), I75-L77.
14Ibid., 177.
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means but always at the same time as an end.”15 Holding that persons are ends and
should never be treated only as means has been the fundamental concept some
philosophers have used for establishing rights-based theories even though Kant clearly
worked from a concern for the rational integrity o f persons who would treat other people
in a purely instrumental way.16

Utilitarianism
During the last quarter o f the 18th Century, the effects o f the industrial revolution
created intense social pressures in England with the doubling of the population, the
steadily increasing urbanization and the disruptions o f industrialism. In this environment,
Jeremy Bentham, a radical (not violent) reformer, advanced a complex theory o f utility to
be used “as a test for moral action and a practicable standard for social policy, especially
legislation.”17
From a basis o f egoist hedonism that argued man was governed only by pain and
pleasure and that both determined man’s actions, Bentham constructed a theory of
utilitarianism in which an action was moral only if its consequences were more favorable
than unfavorable to everyone - or provided the greatest happiness to the greatest number
o f people. Bentham argued that moral action is not dependent on natural laws or divine
guidance, but rather by abstract moral principles. He also argued that social reform

15Ibid., 178.
16Waldron, 12-13.
17Edel et al., 299.
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should be based on human knowledge of the motivation o f institutions, and on objective,
quantifiable ways of calculating the pain-and-pleasure consequences o f actions.18
Since Bentham’s day, several forms of utilitarianism have emerged addressing the
theoretical limitations o f utilitarianism including rule, preference, ideal and welfare
utilitarianism. All of these variations on Bentham’s original theory, however, have one
factor in common: they are standards forjudging public action based on the “conclusion
that the right action is that which maximizes utility (however constructed) summed
impersonally across all those affected by that action.”19

Applications to Policy Reform
In looking at these brief descriptions of deontological and utilitarian theories, it is
obvious they differ in very fundamental ways. One (deontology) bases morality on
principles o f duty or obligation without regard for the consequences of the moral act (one
must return a borrowed gun to its owner, even if the owner states she is going to shoot
someone with it). The other (utilitarianism) focuses strictly on outcome, i.e., actions that
maximize the greatest good (torture of an individual may be permissible if the
information gathered in interrogation would save a great many lives). The one holds as a
categorical imperative that no individual can be used as a means to an end, and the other
asserts that the end (the greatest good) is all that counts and anything (or anyone) should
be used to achieve the end.

18 Ibid., 298-299.
19 Robert Goodin, “Utility and the Good,” A Companion to Ethics, ecL Peter
Singer (Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, Inc., 1991), 245.
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In today’s political discourse, the two most often heard arguments mirror the
differences between these theories: either we cannot implement social policies that deny
the individual rights o f persons, or we must implement policies that promote the good o f
society —even though some individual rights are lost (or trammeled, depending on the
point o f view). In creating the best public policies, lawmakers must focus their attention
on finding ways to accommodate both o f these very different types o f arguments —a
seemingly insurmountable task on the surface, but one that can be accomplished if both
sides have common goals.

For instance, in divorce reform, some emphasize the

individual rights of the spouse(s) desiring a divorce, while others worry about the effects
on society o f making divorce too easy to obtain. But it is not difficult for people to agree
that parents have an obligation or duty to care for their children. From this point of
agreement, we can then work toward a change in current policy that will meet that end.

CHAPTER 5

THE RIGHT TO DIVORCE

As an introduction to his book, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities, Arthur J.
Dyck quotes G.E.M. Anscombe as noting that English philosophers have helped construct
"systems according to which the man who says W e need such-and-such, and will only get it
this way' may be a virtuous character."1 Anscombe complains that this includes accepting
as moral many circumstances that can only be called strictly unjust —that equate to "the
judicial condemnation of the innocent"2 It is not difficult to perceive the current status o f
our divorce laws in exactly the same manner the individual's right to pursuit o f happiness
(divorce) through unilateral divorce systems has impacted unjustly on the quality of life o f
children and women in our nation.
A hue and cry is rising to fix our divorce system gone awry, but the fix is problematic
because it requires a shift from focusing on rights to focusing on responsibilities —from
strict individualism to a more organic or community-based focus. The tension between
individual rights and community responsibilities in seeking a divorce versus maintaining a

1 Arthur J. Dyck, Rethinking Rights and Responsibilities: The Moral Bonds o f
Community. (Cleveland, Ohio: Pilgrim Press, 1994), 3.
2Ibid, 4.
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marriage remains at the core o f our inability to devise reforms to no-fault policies. This
chapter investigates the impact o f individual rights on divorce law.

Constitutional Influence
As we have seen, our cultural traditions have made our society receptive to rights
dominated thought and processes -- the appeal to rights is how we have always advanced
our interests and causes. In the words of Benjamin R. Barber, "Rights are how we enter our
political conversation; they are the chips with which we bargain, collateral in the social
contract"3
In today's society, those rights are increasingly (one might even say obsessively)
becoming focused on the private individual rather than on the individual as community
member or citizen. This gives rise to an environment where a spouse can insist that it is his
or her right to unilaterally end a marriage and walk away from dependent children leaving
them both emotionally and economically bereft
Originally, however, the American emphasis on rights had a different purpose than to
advance strictly personal interests. While Federalists and Anti-Federalists both saw the
Constitution as a means of furthering rights, each camp had its own agenda for the use of a
rights-based Constitution. The Federalists wanted a government capable o f guaranteeing its
citizens' rights; the Anti-Federalists wanted to be sure citizens' rights were protected from
the government Barber links these differing interests to Hobbes and Locke: "In the

3 Benjamin A. Barber, "Constitutional Rights — Democratic Instrument or
Democratic Obstacle," hi Th<* Fram m and FmyfamgntaT Right* Robert A. Licht, editor,
(Washington, D.C.: The AEI Press, 1992), 23.
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Federalist case, there is a Hobbesian faith in strong contract-based government as a
guarantor o f rights; in the anti-Federalist case there is a Lockean distrust o f strong
government that issues in a strong version of rights understood as constraints on
government."4
In both cases, however, the individual rights protected by the Constitution were
founded in political participation and civic responsibility. It was clearly understood that the
rights of citizenry entailed civic responsibilities and duties. Today, this distinction has
nearly disappeared, and rights have become something to which one is bom. We forget
that the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, when entailed with civic duty, laid the
cultural and political foundation for the communities in which we live. The sense of
individual rights belonging to an actively participating citizen o f the community has all but
disappeared leaving only a notion of individual rights belonging to each as a person rather
than as a citizen. According to Barber, "Rights cease to be a civic identity to be posited and
won; they become a natural identity to be discovered, worn, and enjoyed."5 This attitude
has led us to a place where individual rights have ceased to be the rights of citizens involved
in a community but have become the personal, private rights o f each individual to be left
alone —to live as he or she pleases without regard for the community.6
This obsession with private rights (to the near exclusion o f political discourse on the
public good) is evident in many of the outcries against invasion o f privacy: opposition to

4 Ibid., 25.
5 Ibid., 33.

6 Glendon, Mary Arm, R ight* T alk (New York: The Free Press, 1991), p. 48.
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roadside sobriety checks, to the mandated use o f seat belts and motorcycle helmets, and to
airport security checks, for example. These areas of concern that normally are considered
community rights, or at least the responsibility o f citizens as members of a community, are
given short shrift —they "are not weighed and. found wanting; they are ignored.

The

language o f rights simply is not permitted to extend to them."7 This is exactly the case we
find in the arena o f marriage, divorce, and family law.
In addition, the Declaration o f Independence by affirming the right of the pursuit of
happiness also encourages our tendency to view divorce as a right. The pursuit of
happiness is a Lockean idea. Locke proposed that human beings develop a notion of
happiness that goes beyond merely seeking pleasure and avoiding pain, and that we
consciously pursue the goal o f attaining happiness. According to Locke, the concept o f the
pursnit o f happiness accounts "for the various and contrary ways men take, though all aim
at being happy." Because we each seek happiness in our own, individual ways, and because
the pursuit o f happiness is an inescapable part of being human, Locke believed that any
society living within the guidance o f nature had to provide freedom or at least tolerance for
individual goals of happiness.8
By including this right in the Declaration o f Independence, the citizens o f the United
States have been given a guarantee o f freedom to pursue their own happiness each in his or

7 Barber, 34.
8 Michael P. Zuckert, "Thomas Jefferson on Nature and Natural Rights," in The
Framers and Fundamental Rights Robert A. Licht, editor, (Washington, D.C.: The AEI
Press, 1992), 161-162.

57
her own respective, individual ways. Ronald Hamowy exactly captures the sense of this
freedom:
They [citizens] may act as they choose in their search for ease, comfort,
felicity, and grace, either by owning property or not, by accumulating wealth
or distributing it, by opting for material success or asceticism, in a word, by
determining the path o f their own earthly and heavenly salvation as they alone
see fit9
Locke, however, clearly understood the pitfall in our pursuit of happiness —in feet, he
understood that pursuit as personal and individual from the outset In An. Essay Concerning
Human-Understanding, Locke wrote he was "forced to conclude that good, the greater
good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be so, does not determine the will, until
our desire, raised proportionately to it makes us uneasy in the want of it" 10 (Italics are
Locke's.) In other words, Locke concluded that the greater good only truly becomes our
concern when it intersects with our own personal "desires”—in which case we will become
"uneasy" and may then assert our "will" in the form o f action to pursue our own happiness.
For the framers of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, however,
rights in general, and the right to pursue happiness in particular, were not disconnected from
the duty we owe the community, the responsibility to act without causing harm to others.
Our problem, as Barber succinctly wrote, is that "the powerful alliance between rights and
political emancipation, between the claim to be a person and the right to be a citizen, has
come unstuck." Our conception o f rights in the private individual sense has overshadowed

9 Ibid, 162, quoting Ronald Hamowy, "Jefferson and the Scottish Enlightenment,
William and Mary Quarterly, vol 36 (1979), 549.
10 John Locke, An-Essay. Concerning Human Understanding, ed., A. D. Woozley
(New American Library, October 1974), 173.
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the underlying truth that rights belong to citizens and come entailed with community duties
and responsibilities.11 Our arrival at this place of disconnected rights and responsibilities
may partially account for the ease with which four hundred years of fault-based divorce law
was supplanted with the no-fault policies of the 1970s.

Rights Talk
Contrary to some beliefs, this disconnect between individual rights and community
responsibilities is not new —it is not a product of the 1960s or 1980s. In fact, its symptoms
go back at least to the 19th century. For instance, in 1890 two lawyers, Samuel D. Warren
and Louis D. Brandeis, co-authored an article for the Harvard f .aw.Review titled "The Right
to Privacy." In this article, Warren and Brandeis stated:
That the individual shall have full protection in person and in property is a
principle as old as the common law; but it has been found necessary from time
to time to define anew the exact nature and extent o f such protection. . . .
Gradually the scope of these legal rights [to life, liberty, and property]
broadened; and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy life —
the right to be let alone.12
Nonetheless, while the tendency to appropriate rights as private, individual rights is an
old theme in the American political landscape, the problem o f rights talk that restricts and
diminishes the effectiveness o f political discourse is new.
In her book,

R ig h ts T a lk -
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Glendon argues that this new version o f rights talk has become increasingly dominant over

11 Barber, 33.
12 Glendon, 47, quoting Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, "The Right to
Privacy," 4 Harvard Law Review, (1890) 193.
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the past thirty years. Glendon contends that our current rights talk is different from that o f
previous American eras (and that of other liberal democracies as well) in its "starkness and
simplicity, its prodigality in bestowing the rights label, its legalistic character, its
exaggerated absoluteness, its hyperindividualism, its insularity, and its silence with respect
to personal, civic, and collective responsibilities."13 While this abbreviated form o f
discourse may fit our media-influenced culture of political sound-bites, it does not lend
itself to political discourse that opens avenues of compromise and provides for the mutual
understanding that is necessary for settling issues on common ground.
The issues of marriage and divorce have not been exempt from the malaise o f rights
talk that diminishes responsibility and focuses on individual rights. To understand the
effects o f the individual right to divorce (in the pursuit of happiness), it is necessary to
understand something of family law in the United States. When children are involved, the
issues of divorce are inextricably tangled in our ways of defining family, the importance we
put on family as a culture, and in family law. In fact, the most serious contention in the
political discourse over divorce is the consequences of divorce to women and children —the
family created in a marriage.
Until the 1960s it was more or less universally accepted in the United States that
"family" meant a husband-father responsible for providing financially for his family, a wifemother who was homemaker and primary care-giver, and their children.

The law

emphasized family solidarity —one could not usually bring suit against members o f oners

13Glendon, x.
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immediate family (husband, wife, children) for example, and constitutional law supported
this view until the late 1960s early 1970s.
Glendon uses the example of two Supreme Court cases to illustrate the quick shift in
the Court's view o f the family. In describing a marriage in a 1965 birth control case
involving a married couple's right to privacy, the Court stated: "Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being
sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not
political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects."14 Compare this
language to the language of a subsequent 1972 birth control case involving an unmarried
woman's right to privacy, and it is easy to see the shift from family unit to the focus on
individuals disconnected from each other. The 1970 case cited that "the married couple is
not an independent entity with a mind and heart o f its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional make-up."15
Aside from the language of the courts, Glendon postulates that our individual rightsladen talk prevents us from expressing and understanding competing interests and goals.
Glendon reminds us that thinking and speaking of divorce in terms of rights makes it
difficult to "take account of the obvious fact that the public has a much greater interest in
the conditions under which children are being raised than in the ways that adults generally
choose to arrange their lives."16 This lack of social focus is obvious in the feet that the

14Ibid., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965).
15IbicL, 123, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
16Ibid., 125.
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United States does not have a coherent national family policy, and that we are only slowly
moving toward policy that makes a distinction between childless marriages and marriages
with children.

The Major Political Parties and Family Issues
None o f this is to say that families or family issues are forgotten or unattended by
three o f our largest political parties, the Republicans, the Democrats and the Libertarians.
To the contrary all of them include statements and proposals regarding families and
governments’ proper role in family issues. The underlying problem, however, remains in
the degree o f importance each places on the role of individual rights.
The Libertarian Party, as can be expected, places the utmost importance on individual
rights. In fact, their Statement of Principle (which serves as a preamble to the party
platform) states:
We the members o f the Libertarian Party, challenge the cult o f the omnipotent
state and defend the rights of the individual. We hold that all individuals have
the right to exercise sole dominion over their own lives, and have the right to
live in whatever manner they choose, so long as they do not forcibly interfere
with the equal right of others to live in whatever manner they choose.17
Consistent with this opening statement, the Libertarians oppose government
regulation o f the lives of individual and interference with private property. Further, the
platform states that Libertarians "oppose all interference by government in the areas and
contractual relations among individuals.”18

17 1998 Libertarian Party Platform, Libertarian Party web site (online), accessed on
6 April 2000, available from http://www.lp.org/pIatform/; Internet.
18 Ibid.
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Of families specifically, the Libertarian Platform states, “We support protection of the
integrity of families and households as contractual institutions against government intrusion
and interference.”19 Although the platform does not mention the issues of divorce, it is
obvious that the Libertarians call most strongly for the rights o f individuals and would
support the right o f consenting parties to divorce without further involvement from the
government on the issues of division o f assets, child custody or support. In fact, the
Libertarian platform indirectly addresses this issue by stating that individuals should be free
to make their own choices and then be free to be responsible for them; that governmental
intervention through laws that deny individuals the opportunity to exercise their decisions
(e.g., to divorce) actually encourages irresponsibility.
The Republican and Democrat platforms both address the issue o f families in terms o f
strong families creating the foundation for improving social problems and improving the
quality of life for everyone. Both platforms address remedies for many of the economic
issues that make family living difficult, such as tax breaks for working parents, adequate
health care availability and education opportunities. The major difference for the two
parties is the means of achieving these ends.
The Republicans work for minimal government intervention, stressing that our
religious, community and private groups o f all kind are the best sources for “tackling the
social ills that government programs have only worsened.”20 In this regard, the Republicans

19Ibid.
20 TQQ6 T?ep n h lfran P arty P latfo rm Republican Party web site (online), accessed on
6 April 2000, available from http://www.yoIogop.org/pIat6.htm; Internet.
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agree with, the Libertarians that people will Ieam to be most responsible for their actions
through other than governmental means.
The Democrats, however, choose alternatives that require more government
involvement. Their platform specifically addresses the need for laws that allow parents to
take time off without pay or work flex-time to attend school functions, parent-teacher
conferences or take a child to the doctor. More specifically to the issue of divorce,
however, the 1996 Democratic Platform included a section on child support calling for a
crackdown on deadbeat parents, stating, “If you neglect your responsibility to your children,
we will suspend your license, garnish your wages, track you down, and make you pay.”21

The Communitarian Perspective
While not a political party, the communitarian movement should be noted here as
having the most specific platform that deals with the issues of divorce. As noted in Chapter
One, the communitarian movement is a leading group in the call for divorce reform. The
movement is a nonsectarian, nonpartisan coalition o f individuals and organizations whose
purpose is “to shore up the moral, social, and political environment.”22

The

communitarians believe that strong individual liberties presume strong responsibilities, and
that the best way to achieve strong individual liberties depends on bolstering families,

21 t QQ* r v m n r r a t f r Par ty Platform 1Democratic Party web site (online); accessed on
6 April 2000; available from http://www.democrats.org/hq/resources/platform/rndex.html;
Internet.

The Communitarian Network web
site
(online);
accessed
on
4
April
2000;
available
from
http://www.communitariannetwork.org/pIatforintexLhtm; Internet.
22 t q q t R w pnrw tvff r nm m n n itarian P latform ,
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schools and neighborhoods as the foundations of civil society. The movement has a centrist
philosophy focused on “finding effective ways to restore social and moral consensus
without a small group o f people imposing a set of behaviors and values on all of us.”23
In the Responsive Communitarian Platform, a seminal document o f the
communitarian movement, a communitarian perspective is defined as recognizing both
individual human dignity and the social dimensions of human existence, and the connection
between strong individual liberties and the active maintenance of the institutions of society.
In order to bring the regard for individual rights into a better relationship with a sense
o f personal and civic responsibilities, the communitarians emphasize starting with the
family. To accomplish this, the communitarians focus on the premise that bringing children
into the world entails a moral responsibility to provide not only material necessities, but
also moral education, which requires that the parents be present in the lives of their children.
The platform recommends specific changes to facilitate this, including workplaces with
flexible opportunities for parents to attend to their roles as parents, a realignment o f our
attitudes toward child-rearing, recognition that children are best served by a two-parent
family, and changes in divorce laws that would modify, but not prevent, divorce.
Additionally, many of the voices heard in the debate over divorce are communitarian.
Amitai Etzioni, Mary Ann Glendon, and William A. Galston, as well as The Council on
Families in America, are representative of this group.

23Ibid.
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The Case For Reform
The view in constitutional law of maritaL partners as separate individuals is most
evident in no-fault divorce law that recognizes little or no connection between partners o f a
marriage beyond an easily broken legal contract to live together as husband and wife. As
we have seen, no-fault laws allow either party to unilaterally seek divorce for no better
reason than incompatibility —which translates into the pursuit of happiness for at least onehalf of the partners in the marriage contract Consequently, the change from fault to no
fault divorce laws had the effect of de-emphasizing the "right" to remain married and
emphasizing

the "right" to divorce.24

Perhaps even worse, the no-fault divorce laws emphasize the individual right to
divorce. This right is singularly devoid o f responsibility to the other marital partner or the
children o f the marriage, neither in regard to the other partner’s wishes for continuing or
saving the marriage, nor in terms of continued duty or obligation to one's children once the
marriage is dissolved.
The right to unilaterally decide to divorce exactly reflects what Sandel calls the notion
of the “unencumbered self, independent o f roles and unbound by moral ties one chooses to
reject.,,2s In other words, we have become disconnected from our roles and the associated
responsibilities of being parents and spouses: unencumbered by the obligations or duties of
a father or mother, for instance, one can simply walk away from a marriage and a family
without feeling further responsibility.

24 Sandel, 108-109.
25Ibid., 112.
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Unilateral, no-fault divorce possibly epitomizes the results o f exercising individual
rights with no concomitant acceptance of responsibilities. As Sandel points out, no-fault
divorce law fails to respect traditional roles and penalizes mothers and homemakers who
have lived their married lives as "situated selves" —people whose identities were constituted
by their roles. These are the women who have depended on their husbands for economic
support and in return cared for children and home so that their husbands could pursue their
careers.26

In practice, this means that women and children frequently experience a

significant decrease in their standard of living.
As the evidence of the fallout of divorce mounts, more and more voices are calling for
divorce reform —in particular for cases o f divorce involving children. From the Democrats,
First Lady Hillary Clinton recently wrote in her syndicated newspaper column, "I think
getting a divorce should be much harder when children are involved. . . . Divorce has
become too easy because o f our permissive laws and attitudes."27 In a New„York, .Times
editorial published in December o f 1995, Communitarian William A. Galston wrote, 'Tor
couples with dependent children, we should e liminate unilateral no-fault [divorce]. . . and
return to an updated fault-based system, with the alternative o f a five-year waiting period."28
And in the last three years, eighteen states including Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa,

26 Sandel, 114.
27 Elizabeth Schoenfeld, "Drumbeats for Divorce Reform," Policy Review, MayJune 1996,8.
28Ibid.

67
Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia and Washington have introduced proposals to
reform their respective state laws.29
It becomes clear that there is a tremendous interest in reforming the no-fault divorce
policies - and there is a common ground among these groups that recognizes that healthy
families create environments for people to reach their full potential whereas the division of
families increases the likelihood of delinquency and crime. These are the factors, after all,
that have a tremendous impact on the success or failure of our economic and political
survival as a nation.30 It is likewise evident that the real challenge is constructing a policy
reform that will be accepted in the current culture of individual rights while still retaining
the facility to protect the victims o f divorce (children, women and to some degree, the
partners who truly wish to save their marriages).

The Responsibilities O f Divorce
It is tremendously important in this discussion to always bear in mind the distinction
between marriages with children and marriages without children. Margaret Mead most
eloquently stated:
We badly need to recognize a new form of marriage — a marriage between
childless partners with no c o mm itment to continuity. Such marriages should be
easier to contract, should involve no automatic economic relationships, and
should be capable of dissolution by mutual consent, without undue delay, cost
or supervision from the constituted organs o f society. On the other hand,
marriages which are parental should be placed in a different category, and have
29 Kim A. Lawton, '"No Fault’ Divorce Under Assault, Christianity Today, April 8,
1996, vol. 40 n 4,85.
30 Mary Ann Glendon, R ig h ts T a lV(New York: The Free Press, 1991), 126.
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built into them, once more the conception of what marriage with children is —a
lifelong relationship which will end only with death."31
In keeping with this, it might be helpful to create two separate, distinct divorce laws: one
for childless marriages, and one for "parental marriages."
Divorce in Nnn-parental Marriages
With the exception of the unilateral right to divorce, the current no-fault divorce laws
are basically consistent with Mead's recommendation for childless marriages: they are
dissolvable without undue delay, cost or supervision from the courts or government. The
issue then for these marriages is mutual consent. Several possibilities for cases lacking
consent come to mind: provisions could be allowed that force the suing partner to maintain
the non-consenting partner’s standard of living for a specified time; marriage counseling
could be imposed by the courts; or unilateral petitions could be denied except in the case of
abuse, adultery or other egregious forms o f behavior (basically a return to the old fault
system). While all three of these options would require a longer delay, more cost and more
supervision from the courts, they still offer recourse to the non-consenting spouse who, after
all, has rights, too.
Of these options, however, the provision for maintaining a non-consenting spouse’s
standard of living has the most appeal for several reasons. Spouses who know that a
unilateral divorce will cost them (attorney’s fees and court costs in addition to monies or
property awarded to the non-consenting spouse) should be more likely to work harder with

31As quoted by Wheeler, 172.
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the non-consenting spouse to arrive at a mutually acceptable divorce agreement (outside the
court's jurisdiction) or reconcile the differences in the marriage on their own.
This option also creates a cushion for the non-working spouse, who though childless,
may not have worked outside the home during the marriage and finds him- or herself
unprepared to re-enter the workforce. In an article in Dissent (Summer 1991), Susan MoIIer
Okin argues that this option is a means o f diminishing the disparity between men's and
women's financial situation after divorce —and in that regard, this option works well for
divorces in parental marriages also. Okin also suggests that the lost economic potential of a
marriage should be considered: "Change must begin with the recognition that future
earning power is the principal asset of most marriages."32 (Italics are Okin’s.)

She

recommends that the arrangement after divorce should "aim to equalize the standards of
living of both post-divorce households," and that the amount awarded and the length of time
the support would continue should depend on both the length as well as the practices o f the
marriage (i.e., did both partners work outside the home, and if so, what was the difference
in their paychecks, opportunities for advancement, benefits packages, etc.).33
The problems with this option, however, are easily recognized: it increases the
likelihood of litigation (as opposed to simply filing a petition for divorce); it would increase
the workload of an already overburdened family court; and its fair and equitable
administration and enforcement would require new ways of thinking. Of all these obstacles,
administration and enforcement might be the hardest to overcome. For instance, as we see

32 Susan MoIIer Okin, "Economic Equality After Divorce: 'Equal Rights* or Special
Benefits?" Dissent, Summer 1991,385.
33Ibid., 386.
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currently with child support, collecting court-ordered payments can be difficult. Obviously
the most efficient way to enforce a financial ruling of this sort is to garnish wages —and
that brings us to a whole different issue o f individual rights!
In the end, however, this type o f approach seems fair to all parties because it addresses
the rights of both spouses and requires actions based on the recognition of attendant
responsibilities. Each spouse may have the right to divorce, but that right does not include
neglecting to meet obligations one accepted on entering the marriage.
O iv n r r e in M a rria g e s w ith P h ild re n

The most serious concern in the current discourse on divorce, of course, is the well
being of the children of divorce, which as we have seen, is also the most common argument
for no-fault divorce reform. This common thread could be the key factor to developing a
new divorce policy —that all-elusive common ground. Even arguments that downplay the
need for divorce reform acknowledge that life is more difficult both emotionally and
economically for the children of divorce —here the differences are only in the degree and
the longevity of these ill effects.
The real difficulty in fashioning divorce reform policy lies in the substantially
differing approaches to how the reform should proceed. This is due in large part to the
underlying belief systems about marriage, divorce, individual rights and community
responsibility that ultimately affect the ways people approach the issue. Basically, there are
two camps in this discussion; both seek to ameliorate as much as possible the economic and
emotional damages caused by divorce but one does so by focusing on saving the marriage,
the other by focusing on just and fair treatment in the event of divorce.
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For instance, the Council on Families in America ( working from a communitarian,
pro-marriage perspective) recommends such changes as:
♦

Reform no-fault divorce laws to emphasize the importance of marriage
especially where children are involved; give support o f the law to the partner
trying to save the marriage.

♦

Formulate vision statements that establish goals to strengthen marriage and
denounce out-of-wedlock childbirths.

♦

Change the tax code to favor marriages, e.g., by eliminating the marriage
penalty, increasing the personal exemption, and creating a $1,000 per child
refundable tax credit.

4

Provide funds (credits or vouchers) for parents who leave school or the
workplace for an extended period of time to care for young children.

♦

Replacethe welfare system with approaches that discourage unwed
motherhood and that empower families, e.g., mandatory identification of
fathers before benefits can be used, programs that encourage unwed teenage
mothers to place their children up for adoption, favor marriages-withchildren in the allocation o f subsidized housing, and create a poverty tax
credit whereby taxpayers could directly allocate a portion o f their taxes to
nonprofit organizations that work to reduce child poverty and strengthen
families.

♦

Reassess state and federal child support enforcement programs and foster
more marriage and more fatherhood.

♦

Provide an annual measurement of the nation’s marital health using the
following statistics:

percent o f adults married, percent o f first intact

marriages, numbered of births to married parents, percent of children living
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with their natural parents, and percent o f children living with two married
parents.34
All of these recommendations focus on strengthening marriages and promoting a
culture where marriage is a valued institution. Additionally, these recommendations play
best to those who are moved by virtue, civic responsibility, a sense of community and
(without referring to it) religious duty.
The other side o f the reform recommendations comes from those who are less
impelled to see marriage as a sacred institution to be saved at all or nearly all costs —
instead they are seeking justice and equity in the event of divorce. This camp sees divorce
as an inevitable corollary to many marriages but not necessarily as something that needs to
be devastating to the women and children involved. Recommendations from this side
include:
♦

Distributing wealth and property equitably rather than equally; for example,
a wife and two children equal three-fourths of the family and should receive
three quarters of the family property and wealth.

♦

Financial distributions that recognize the future earnings of the primary
bread winner including considerations such as benefits and professional
status.

34 The Council on Families in America, "Marriage in America: A Report to the
Nation," Promises To Keep:__Decline and Renewal o f Marriage in.America, David
Popenoe, Jean Bethke Flshtain, and David Blankenhom, eds. (Lantham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 313-314.
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♦

Garnishing o f wages to insure support payments are made.

♦

Decrees that assign the home to the custodial parent.35

Looking at these differing views of the problem only reinforces the need to carefully
analyze the motivations and expectations that accompany any proposed divorce reform. To
successfully appeal to both camps (and any others in between), divorce reform must strike a
balance between individual rights (with its focus on the procedure o f divorce) and
community responsibility (with its focus on encouraging marriages).

Conclusion
In her book, Tbe-Way-We-Never-Were:_ American Eamilies and the. Nostalgia Trap,
Stephanie Coontz reminds us that children, while certainly their parents’ responsibility, are
also the responsibility of the community at large. To make her point, Coontz relates the
story of a Jesuit missionary from France and his encounter with the Montagnais-Naskapi
Indians in 16th century North America. The Jesuit was appalled by the MontagnaisNaskapi traditions of child-rearing and egalitarian relations between husbands and wives, in
particular the lax sexual code tolerated amongst the women. After many failed attempts to
persuade the Naskapi men to impose stricter monogamy on then wives, the Jesuit finally
came to what he believed was an incontestable reason for his side. When the Jesuit
explained to a Naskapi man that if his wife had sexual relations with others, he would never

3S See Weitzman; Okin; Talbot; Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion nf
Equality:—The. Rhetoric and. Reality nf-Divnrre Reform, (Chicago: The University o f
Chicago Press, 1991); and Kay Henna HOI, “An Appraisal o f California’s No-Fault
Divorce Law, California Law Review, Jan 1987, vol. 75, issue 1:319.
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know for sure if the children she bore were really his, the Naskapi man answered: "Thou
hast no sense.. . . You French people love only your own children; but we love all the
children o f our tribe."36
While divorce reform gets bogged down in individual rights versus community
responsibility arguments, political priorities, and special interest group straggles, we seem
to be losing sight of what amounts to the common ground for all factions: the welfare of
our nation's children. Our individual right to bear children brings a responsibility to care for
them; our right to live in an orderly society bears the responsibility of providing for our
children so that society may continue. In the end, the individual right to divorce must not
be allowed to trump all other family and community rights.

36Coontz, 231.

CHAPTER 6

TOWARD DIVORCE REFORM

While few will argue that a high divorce rate is good for the nation, there are
many, very diverse arguments for why a high divorce rate is not good. Many of these
arguments center around the importance o f intact families in our culture. As evidence of
this widely held belief, consider that the Carter administration was elected in part on a
campaign that promised a political focus on family issues; that during the Reagan and
Bush administrations, there were pushes from the religious right to reestablish family
values that emphasized the importance o f the traditional family; and that President
Clinton also used pro-family language as part of his election campaign. In short, across
time and politics, Americans believe in the value of families to society, and much o f the
debate over divorce is embedded in this larger issue o f family values.1
Since 1996, and within the context o f concern for “family values,” eighteen states
including Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Pennsylvania, Virginia

1This focus on family m politics has also led to many efforts to define family: do
we mean the traditional family, the extended family, a family including close friends?
Can people with alternative lifestyles be successful as parents and constitute a family?
This issue, however, is beyond the scope o f this paper, which focuses only on the effects
o f divorce on the traditional, mother-father-and-children unit.
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and Washington have introduced proposals to reform their respective state divorce laws.
The Michigan initiative was introduced on Valentine's Day 1997 by State Representative
Jessie Dalman. Dalman proposes to return to a fault-based system in which there is no
unilateral divorce except in instances where cause can be proven, specifically adultery,
physical abuse, desertion, substance abuse or imprisonment The proposal, supported by
the Michigan Family Forum, would require divorcing parents to receive counseling on
the effects of divorce on children and to submit a post-divorce parenting plan. Dalman
also proposes incentives for premarital counseling including a break on the fee paid for
the marriage license and a reduced waiting period after applying for a license. Over thirty
states have requested copies o f the Michigan bill.2
Although no significant reform has been passed to date, the 1990s was obviously
the decade of no-fault divorce reform at the state level. At the broadest level, the
argument against easy, no-fault divorce ultimately has taken one of two tacks —either it
is not good for society because it contributes to the worst of a community’s ills (increased
crime, lower education statistics, higher drug addiction, etc.), or it is not good for the
economy (often for the same reasons). In either case, maintaining traditional family
relationships (i.e., protecting children from the effects of divorce) has been seen as the
key to alleviating these social problems.
Although the ramifications of divorce for children are clear, the solution for
policy makers has proven problematic, primarily because American culture, steeped in
individual rights and focused on the pursuit o f happiness, does not support a return, to

2 Lawton, 85.
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fault-based divorce laws that make divorce more difficult to obtain. Before analyzing the
reasons for our failure to implement divorce law reform in the 1990s, however, we need
to understand the underlying arguments put forth by each group seeking reform so that
future policy efforts can draw on overlapping values to fashion divorce reform that will
be more acceptable to the American public.

The Issues and the Players
The overriding issue for most proponents of divorce reform in the 1990s is a
growing concern over the erosion o f family values. Defining the term “family values,”
however, is problematic because it means different things in different contexts to
different groups. The Council on Families offers the following definition when referring
to family values:
The loving two-married-parent family is the best environment for children —
the place where children gain the identity, discipline, and moral education
that are essential for their full individual development. And, as the
institution which most effectively teaches the civic virtues of honesty,
loyalty, trust, self-sacrifice, personal responsibility, and respect for others,
the family is an irreplaceable foundation for long-term social efficacy and
responsibility.3
This description is consistent with the communitarian call for "restoring the moral
voice" starting with, the family and insisting that "bringing children into the world entails
a moral responsibility to provide, not only material necessities, but also moral education
and character formation."4 Furthering this idea, the communitarian platform states that

3 The Council on Families in America, 294.
4 1991 Responsive Communitarian Platform (online).
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two-parent families are better able to discharge their child-raising duties, that divorce is
not in the best interest o f children, and that "divorce laws should be modified, not to
prevent divorce, but to signal society's concern."5
Allan Carlson, president o f the Rockford Institute in Illinois and director o f its
Center on the Family, concurs in even stronger language. In his 1995 article "The
Family: Where Do We Go from Here?" Carlson states that "we need to raise the political
visibility and muscle of the family cause, relative to the demands o f the corporate
economy, the state, and the new world order."6 While Carlson supports the repeal o f no
fault divorce laws, he is also concerned with over-regulation of pro-family issues: "In the
United States, the greatest threat to democratic rule is the federal court system, which
over the last half-century has struck down hundreds of democratically created pro-family
measures"7(emphasis is Carlson’s).
The Christian communities have also been active in calling for divorce reform
based primarily on family issues. In 1991, the bishops o f the Catholic Church published
"Putting Children and Families First," a report that urged Catholics to reconsider "the
consequences o f permissive divorce" and called for modifications in divorce laws to
"recognize the frequently devastating consequences o f divorce on children."8 In line with

5 Ibid., 8.
6Allan Carlson, "The Family: Where Do We Go from Here?" Society, Jul-Aug,
1995,63.
7Ibid., 64.
8 Lawton, 86.
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this, Protestant leaders are beginning to call for policies that will save marriages. Mary
Stewart Van Leeuwen, a professor o f gender studies at Eastern College, recom m ends that
churches develop a "just divorce theory" similar to the criteria theologians have
developed on war. Van Leeuwen adds that the "default option [in a divorce] should
obviously be toward the maintenanc e o f marriage."9
The issue for feminists, however, is framed differently. Rather than addressing a
concern over family values, feminists have rallied behind the issue of equality of
treatment in the law which has led women and children into economic catastrophe.
Martha Fineman argues that by focusing on the issue o f equal treatment before the law,
reforms of fault-based divorce and family law "have actually reinforced men's control
within the family before and after divorce."10
Additionally, recent statistics that indicate that single-parent families headed by
women are the "new poor" are part o f the argument Fineman uses to advance her call for
"result-equality" laws that place individuals in essentially equal positions. Such rules
would take into account the different positions of men and women in our society and
would attempt to achieve parity in the economic positions o f the individuals as a result of
the divorce.11 Fineman recognizes, however, that reforming current divorce and family
laws to ensure that both parties leave the marriage on more or less equal footing may

9 Ibid.
10 Martha Albertson Fineman, The Illusion o f Equality: The Rhetoric and Reality
o f Divorce Reform (Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, 1991), 3.
11Ibid., 39.
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appear unequal, will demand more justification, and will require a shift in the use o f one
of the traditional weapons o f feminism, i.e., insistence on "equality."12

Competing Positions
While we might find a majority o f Americans who agree no-fault divorce reform
is needed to address the economic inequities experienced by minor children, it would be
difficult, indeed, to find a consensus among these many competing positions in the
United States today on what form the change in policy should take. For example, should
we return to fault-based divorces, should we modify the current divorce policy, should we
leave no fault divorce basically intact and concentrate on strengthening the rules applied
to children in divorce, or should there be new rules applied to marriages once a couple
comes before the court seeking divorce? Not surprisingly, each o f these options has its
advocates.
Return to Fault-Based Policies
Although the Christian community has put forth few organized, politically active
calls for divorce reform, the Catholic Church, for instance, would welcome and probably
actively support a return to fault-based divorce (this would secularize and enforce the
Catholic Church's ecclesiastical position). The lack o f political participation, so far, may
partly be attributed to our constitutional separation o f church and state, and also to the
fact that legal divorce is an entirely secular affair occurring without consideration o f
religion. The Catholic Church deals with this secular, legal issue by refusing to recognize

12Ibid., 190.
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the validity o f civil divorce in the lives o f its parishioners. Because divorce is an
unacceptable answer to a troubled marriage, legal divorce is not recognized as valid in the
Catholic Church, and Catholic members cannot remarry in the eyes of the church without
an annulment or dispensation from the church.
One might assume from this that American Catholics probably divorce in fewer
numbers than Americans o f other Christian denom inat i n g but studies show that this is
not true. For example, Robert D. Shull and Joseph Lee Rodgers reported in a 1995 study
that religiosity was not a significant factor in curtailing the divorce rate.
Most surprising here was the finding that the hypothesized negative
relationship between Catholicism and the post-no-fault divorce rate was not
supported. . . . Thus, the religiosity finding in this study may suggest that
belief in the sanctity o f marriage and adherence to religious precepts, though
perhaps once strong enough to prevent the dissolution o f marriages, have
weakened.13
Protestant denominations also deplore divorce, but do not have the same strictures
as the Catholic Church. According to Kim A. Lawton, writing for Christianity Today.
part o f the reason Protestant leaders have not been more active in calling for no-fault
reform may be due to the fact that many Protestant ministers have experienced divorce
themselves. In fact, a 1995 study by Hartford Seminary shows that one-fourth o f female
and one-fifth of male clergy have been divorced.14 In terms of setting or recommending
divorce policy, then, the clergy end-up in the same place as the lawyers who write the

13Robert D. Shull and Joseph Lee Rodgers, "The Effect o f No-Fault Divorce Law
on the Divorce Rate Across the 50 States and Its Relation to Income, Education, and
Religiosity," Journal of Marriage and the Family, May 1995: 486-487.
14Lawton, 86.
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legislation: saying people should not divorce is difficult if you are divorced yourself. Or
as David Ferguson, executive director o f the Center for Marriage and Family Intimacy in
Austin, Texas is quoted as eloquently saying:

"You're not going to prioritize or

emphasize ministry within your church any more than that truth is real in your own
home.”15
Others, such as Tom McMillen, Executive Director of the Rocky Mountain
Family Council, strongly urge a return to fault-based divorce arguing that fault-based
divorce protects children and abused wives, strengthens families, helps prevent dads from
feeling like they have no say in child support awards, and ultimately seeks justice: "Isn’t
it time we started talking about justice and roll back the failed social experiment known
as no-fault divorce?"16
Finally, a surprising call for a return to fault-based divorce comes from the
economic quarter. In his article "The Economic Analysis of the Effect o f No-Fault
Divorce Law on the Divorce Rate," Martin Zelder makes the persuasive case that easy,
no-fault divorces have a negative economic effect by allowing people to divorce who
would otherwise stay married under fault-based laws.

Using a model based on

assumptions of rational, utility-maximizing behavior, Zelder concludes that couples with
a greater fraction o f spending on children (i.e., a higher investment in non-transferable

15 David Ferguson as quoted by Kim A. Lawton, ’"No Fault’ Divorce Under
Assault,” Christianity Today. April 8, 1996:86.
16 Tom McMiHen, "Finding Fault with No-Fault Divorce," (article online) Rocky
Mountain Family Council web site, accessed April 1998, available from
http://www.rmfc.org/, Internet
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goods, namely their children) were less likely to divorce under fault-based laws. Zelder
concludes that no-fault divorce creates an economic inefficiency (too many divorces), and
we should return to fault-based laws which allow the "right" number o f divorces to occur.
Interestingly, he uses the commentaries o f Weitzman, Glendon, Fineman and Jacob to
support the validity of his conclusions.17
Modifying No-Fault Divorce
The communitarians (Etzioni, Glendon, Galston, Elshtain et al.) recommend
modifying current no-fault law. The communitarians actually recommend changes on
three levels: modifying the divorce laws, improving child welfare laws and providing
some types o f relief that would enable more people to stay married.18
Preeminent communitarian William A. Galston suggests a policy o f divorce
reform that would institute a two-tier system of divorce: one set o f rules for couples who
do not have dependent children and another set o f rules for those who do. For couples
without children, Galston sees no problem with the no-fault divorce laws the way they
stand today. For couples with dependent children, however, he recommends eliminating
unilateral no-fault divorces with a return to "an updated fault system" with an alternative
of a five-year waiting period for a divorce to become final. And even for couples with
dependent children who mutually consent to divorce, Galston recommends policy

17 Martin Zelder, "The Economic Analysis o f the Effect of No-Fault Divorce Law
on the Divorce Rate," The Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 16 no. 1,242-262.
18 Jean Elshtain, Enola Aird, Amitai Etzioni, William Galston, Mary Ann
Glendon, Martha Minow, and Alice Rossi, "A Communitarian Position on the Family,"
National Civic Review (Winter 1993), 25-35.
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changes requiring a mandatory waiting period o f at least one year that would allow the
couple time for "reflection, counsel and mediation."19
In addition, Galston supports the "children first” principle recommended by Mary
Ann Glendon, another preeminent communitarian. This principle, according to Glendon
should govern the allocation and distribution o f property in divorce law:
[T]he judge's main task would be to piece together, from property and
income and in-kind personal care, the best possible package to meet the
needs of children and their physical custodian. Until the welfare o f the
children had been adequately secured in this way, there would be no
question of, or debate about, "marital property.” All property, no matter
how or when acquired, would be subject to the duty to provide for the
children.20
Another communitarian supporter, Mary Ann Mason, adds that the "children first"
principle should extend to custody decision-making: she recommends a return to the
legal presumption that mothers are the best custodians for young children. Mason bases
her recommendation on two premises: I) the high incidence o f custody litigation in an
environment where family law offers little if any guidance on securing the "best interests"
o f the child; and 2) the belief that women are biologically and emotionally better suited to
providing "mothering" for children. Mason contends that the current "primary caretaker"
presumption forces both parents to vie for custodial rights in court, increases the
likelihood o f litigation, and creates the possibility o f spousal blackmail where the threat

19 William A. Galston, Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal o f Marriage in
America, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996), 286-287.
20 Mary Ann Glendon, Abortion and Divorce in Western Law (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1987), 95, quoted in William A. Galston, "The
Reinstitutionalization o f Marriage," Promises to Keep: Decline and Renewal of Marriage
in America (Lanham. MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1996), 286.
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o f litigation can be used to intimidate the mother into accepting less than reasonable
property or child support allocations. Mason argues that under a "maternal presumption,"
the father would be less likely to litigate because he would have to provide a
preponderance of evidence that he in fact provides the "mothering" role in the parentchild relationship.21
Some o f the specific reforms to the children’s welfare and tax laws the
communitarians recommend include creating a more enforceable and straightforward
child support system;22 disallowing settlements between parents until adequate provisions
have been made for their minor children;23 tax code changes that favor married families;
and credit vouchers for parents who leave school or the workplace for an extended period
o f time to care for young children.24
The communitarian premise that no parent can divorce a child can be seen as an
extension of Mead's comment on a lifelong relationship between two people who have

21 Mary Ann Mason, "The De-Regulation of Family Law:
Interests?" The Responsive Community, Spring 1993,48-51.

In Whose Best

22 William A. Galston, "A Liberal-Democratic Case for the Two-Parent Family,"
Moral Infrastructure. (New York: S t Martin's Press, Inc., 1995), 146-147.
23 Elshtain etal., 31.
24 Council on Families in America, 313-314.
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children: having children creates an irrevocable bond, like it or not, good or bad, between
the parents.25
Call It "No Fault," But Change the Rules
Feminists also want changes in no-fault divorce laws — or perhaps more
appropriately to the portion of the divorce laws that concern the distribution o f property
and child support and alimony payments. However, feminists are more cautious about
recommending radical changes to the unilateral aspect o f no-fault divorce. Some of the
concern about changing the “easy” divorce laws involves issues o f control and spouse
and child abuse. Some women’s groups in Michigan have argued that “Dalman’s bills
could trap wives into dangerous situations” because the bills require proof o f the abuse.
However, there is consensus among most women’s groups that the law needs to change at
least regarding its economic effects on women and children.26
Surprisingly, although feminists have recognized the need for change in this area
since Lenore Weitzman completed her study on the effects o f divorce on women and
children in 1985, women’s organisations seem to have put little political effort into

25 It is unclear what Mead meant by "will end only with death." She could have
meant that in fact the marriage itself should not be allowed to end. In the context o f
relationships (the law and marriage contracts notwithstanding), one can also assume she
meant that the commitment to the children o f a marriage brings with it a change in the
relationship o f the father and mother — a change that they would not have experienced
without the birth o f the children; a change that cannot be undone m their lifetimes.
26 Lawton, 85-86. For a more in-depth analysis o f the pros and cons o f this issue,
see “End No-Fault Divorce?” First Things: A Monthly Journal o f Religion and Public
Life, August/September 1997: 24-30, for an informative debate o f the pros and cons o f
this position.
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divorce reform. In. 1987, Kay Herma Hill concluded her appraisal o f no-fault divorce in
the state o f California by stating:
As Weitzman has shown in such dramatic detail, women and children have
borne the brunt o f the transition that took place in California’s legal
regulation o f the family between 1970 and 1987. Further changes are
required to prevent such unfortunate and unnecessary results, but a return to
the family law o f 1970 is not one o f them.27
This underlying caution is still evident among feminists today. According to
Martha Fineman this reluctance to change the no-fault laws is an outgrowth of the way
feminists have traditionally framed their arguments in order to obtain political support.
Fineman observes that feminists have historically used two images to gain access to
social institutions: the image of women as victims and the image o f equal treatment. In
the original reform for divorce these two images worked powerfully together to help
advance feminist issues, but unfortunately, the exaggeration o f the images had
unfortunate consequences.28 Under the guise o f neutral fairness, “equality” in property
distribution and child custody has acquired legitimacy in the process of the law, but as we
have already seen, the consequences o f these gender-neutral laws are not equally borne.29
Feminists, then, are fully aware o f the problems created by the fault-based divorce
reforms, but seem unable to break out o f traditional patterns o f obtaining political access,
i.e., the use o f gender-neutral equality as an argument for change.

27 Kay Herma Hill, “An Appraisal o f California’s No-Fault Divorce Law,:
California Law Review, Jan 1987, vol. 75, issue 1:319.
28Fineman, 189.
29Ibid., 174.
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In a break with this pattern, Fineman suggests adopting “results-equality” rather
than the gender-neutral “rules-equality.” She argues that “to achieve equality of result” in
a divorce, it may be necessary to treat spouses dissimilarly when distributing the marital
property, including allocation o f post-divorce income to ensure adequate care o f
children.30 In this regard, she recommends policy changes similar to the communitarians
and groups such as the Council on Families in America. Specifically, she recommends
adoption of Victor Fuchs’ three general principles:
1. Child-centered policies are preferable to labor market interventions.
2. The child-centered benefits should be widely available — not
conditioned on marital status, employment status, or income.
3. The cost o f the programs should be borne by the entire society through
broad-based progressive taxes, not distributed through arbitrary
methods with euphemistic names like “employer provided” day care.31
Finally, one of the original voices calling for reform based on the needs o f
children, Weitzman also recommends changes that include stronger child support rules;
alimony for long-married, older housewives with little or no work experience; awards o f
a greater share o f property to the primary caretaker (usually the mother); consideration for
full support of mothers of younger children in the early years o f the divorce; special
considerations for the sale of the fam ily home; recognition that career assets (e.g.,
enhanced earning capacity, medical insurance, retirement pensions, etc.) are marital
assets that should be considered in the division of property; and stronger social and

30Ibid., 176.
31 Victor Fuchs, Women’s Quest for Economic Equality (1988), 145-146 as
quoted in Fineman, 177.
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economic supports for custodial parents.32 In short, the feminist point of view could be
summed up as “leave unilateral, no-fault divorce in place but create an important caveat:
a spouse can leave a marriage without cause, but not the responsibilities incurred by the
marriage.”

Conclusion
Research clearly reveals a need for reform of our no-fault divorce laws —
arguments against no-fault reform notwithstanding, no one can successfully argue that the
status o f children in divorced homes has not significantly changed due to the changes in
alimony and child support that the no-fault law brings with it. It is evident, therefore, that
reform is necessary and that it should rightfully focus on protecting the interests o f minor
children who, under the current system, suffer not only economic setbacks, but also
psychological ones as they cope with the loss of home, friends, stability and their sense o f
family.
Communitarian themes strongly identify with the welfare of children and
promote the belief that the rules involving the treatment o f children in divorce cases
should change. In the instance o f divorce policy, the communitarians advocate reform
that puts children first:
There is a need for changes in divorce laws to favor children and slow the
rush to divorce
For divorces where children are involved there should be
a new set o f rules based on the principle o f 'children first.’ . . . A parent
32 See Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and
Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America, (New York: The Free
Press, 1985) for a complete discussion.
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should be able to divorce a spouse if a marriage has irretrievably broken.
down, but a parent should never be allowed to divorce a child.33
To protect the rights o f children, communitarians advocate laws that would
systematically increase child support and effectively enforce its collection, thus invoking
the power of the government on behalf o f children. This shift to a focus on children also
significantly changes the other two rights commonly associated with divorce: the right to
be married and the right to divorce.
The communitarians and others who call for modifying the no-fault divorce law in
favor o f children's welfare would re-frame the issue to place primary importance on a
child's right to family and well being. One might term this the "right to have responsible
parents." This indeed would cause a radical change in the application o f current family
law!
The challenge, then, is to create a policy that will achieve the end o f protecting
children o f divorce while most effectively satisfying the diversity o f interested parties
whose opinions on the best means for success vary widely. To a large extent, meeting
this challenge will depend on applying the right methodology, focusing on a systemic
analysis of the problem, and implementation o f solutions that can identify and avoid the
kinds o f unintended, negative results that accompanied the reform in the 1970s.

33 Elshtain, et al., 30-31.

CHAPTER 7

CREATING A POLICY FOR DIVORCE REFORM

There are some constants in the analysis of the rise in America’s divorce rates:
Americans place a high value on individual rights (thus the popularity o f unilateral
divorce), they believe in the pursuit of happiness in both its political and personal
applications, and the unexpected rise in divorce rates since the 1970s has brought a
concomitant rise in the number of single mothers and their children living in poverty.
While this last has stirred a tremendous resurgence of interest in reinstating fault-based
divorce laws, all efforts at reform have failed to produce significant changes to date.
In an article for First Things, Barbara DaFoe Whitehead cites many o f the oftenheard arguments against reinstating fault based divorce laws: fault barriers will only
lengthen the process for most couples who, in the end, will not stay together; litigation
and its attendant costs to society will increase; many o f our young people will decide to
cohabitate rather than marry; and fault-based laws entrap abused women and children in
family situations they can more readily escape under no-fault divorce laws. In this
article, however, she also cites a fundamental reason for no-fault divorce being so widely
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accepted that reform o f no-fault has not been addressed: “the divorce revolution was a
cultural rather than a legal phenomenon.”1
In addition to this crucial observation, Whitehead also reminds us that while very
few would argue that no-fault has been good for us, neither will many support a return to
fault-based laws. In fact, no laws proposing reforms that include re-instituting fault have
passed any state legislature, and the resistance to the reforms seems specific to fault. For
Whitehead, the answer comes down to a disconnect between the cultural norm and the
proposed legislative reforms.
As long as Americans continue to view divorce as an individual and
psychological event, ungovernable by any outside institutions or norms,
fault law will be rejected . . . O f course, political failure is not always a
compelling reason to give up on a worthy cause, but it may recommend a
rethinking o f tactics.2
To counter this cultural disconnect in our search for relief from the woes o f
divorce without the social backing to legally prevent easy divorces, Whitehead
specifically calls for a renewed commitment to marriage by women and the clergy along
with a marriage-saving bias on the part o f marriage and family counselors. While this
tack obviously leads in the direction away from divorce in the long term, it is does
nothing

to alleviate the worst outcomes o f unilateral divorces in the short term, namely

the economic abandonment o f mothers and their children.

1Whitehead, Barbara DaFoe, First Things, “End No-Fault Divorce?” August/
September 1997.
2 Ibid.
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Consequently, some form o f divorce reform acceptable to the public at large must
be crafted as a stop gap measure until our culture embraces a “divorce is bad for you”
norm. The challenge now becomes creating a policy that will negate the consequences o f
unilateral no-fault divorce, while most effectively satisfying the diversify o f interested
parties whose opinions on the best means for success vary widely.

The Failed Call for No-Fault Divorce Reform
In analyzing the recent pushes, both academic and political, for divorce reform, it
is easy to see why so much o f the effort o f the 1990s failed if we regard no-fault divorce
reform o f the 1970s as a cultural phenomenon. While most groups have initiated their
efforts in behalf of children, a large part o f their emphasis has often been on a return to
fault which is unpalatable to the public. For instance, in his bleak article, "The Family:
Where Do We Go from Here?" Allan Carlson recommends radical changes in both nofault divorce and family law, some o f which might be acceptable if he did not also call for
making divorces extremely hard to obtain. His recommendations include:
1. Pro-family tax reform. Carlson favors larger per capita tax exemptions per
family member; a reestablishment o f income splitting for married couples; and
greater progressivity in income tax rates.
2. An end to federal efforts to "reengineer gender roles"3 at home and in the
workplace.

3 Carlson, 63.
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3. A caveat for employers to pay a higher family wage to employees who are
heads of households.
4. Repeal of no-fault divorce laws which have "destroyed the sanctity of
marriage."4 Divorce should be difficult to obtain, and the state should protect
the party working to preserve the marriage.
5. Provisions that protect parental rights.
6. Deregulation o f family economy by eliminating zoning restrictions on home
businesses.s
Though their outlook is not as gloomy nor as strident as Carlsonrs, the Council on
Families in America makes some very similar recommendations to federal, state and local
legislators:
1. Reform no-fault divorce laws to emphasize the importance o f marriage
especially where children are involved; give support of the law to the partner
trying to save the marriage.
2. Formulate vision statements that establish goals to strengthen marriage and
denounce out-of-wedlock childbirths.
3. Change the tax code to favor marriages, e.g., by eliminating the marriage
penalty, increasing the personal exemption, and creating a $1,000 per child
refundable tax credit.

4 Ibid., 64.
5 Ibi(L
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4. Provide funds (credits or vouchers) for parents who leave school or the
workplace for an extended period o f time to care for young children.
5. Replace the welfare system with approaches that discourage unwed
motherhood and that empower families, e.g., mandatory identification of
fathers before benefits can be used, programs that encourage unwed teenage
mothers to place their children up for adoption, favor mamages-with-children
in the allocation of subsidized housing, and create a poverty tax credit
whereby taxpayers could directly allocate a portion of their taxes to nonprofit
organizations that work to reduce child poverty and strengthen families.
6. Reassess state and federal child support enforcement programs and foster
more marriage and more fatherhood.
7. Provide an annual measurement o f the nations’ marital health using the
following statistics:

percent of adults married, percent o f first intact

marriages, numbered o f births to married parents, percent o f children living
with their natural parents, and percent o f children living with two married
parents.6
Within these two examples alone, it is possible to see common threads beyond a
return to fault-based divorce that can be explored to fashion a reform o f policy that could
help mitigate some o f the worst effects o f divorce without returning to a fault-based
system.

6Council on Families in America, 313-314.
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The larger problem, however, remains: Americans still want easy divorces, and
children will still be the victims o f those divorces unless policies are instituted
specifically to protect them. It is imperative, then, to create a policy that protects children
from the worst consequences o f divorce as we continue to search (through social, political
and legal means) for a culturally acceptable divorce reform that will reduce the divorce
rate.

Policy Recommendations
It is apparent that, at least to some degree, civic character and what it means to be
a good citizen are a part of the theories underpinning the case for fault-based divorce
policy. Supporters o f fault-based divorce (both prior to 1970 and in the current debate to
reform no-fault divorce) talk about the need to stem the rise in divorce rates because
children o f divorce have more difficulty in becoming responsible citizens o f society.
During the 1970s reform movement, proponents o f traditional divorce law saw
these obstacles to divorce as representing society's "valid interest in promoting family
stability, pointing to statistics correlating broken homes with higher crane rates and
increased welfare payments, as well as less tangible moral values."7

Today, the

Republicans, the Democrats, the communitarians and other groups all use the same type
o f argument in calling for reform of no-fault divorce. Galston points out that a key
function o f families in a democracy is to provide the training of civic character for our
children, and divorce in families with children creates environments where this type o f

7Wheeler, 8.
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training often does not occur. According to Galston teenage boys being raised without
fathers "contributes to the low self-esteem, anger, violence and peer-bonding through
gang lawlessness characteristic o f many fatherless boys."8 Additionally, Galston and
Mason both argue that the negative effects o f divorce on children are long-lasting and
serious, and that children o f divorce have more difficulty than the average in form ing
relationships and developing bonds o f trust.9 Correspondingly, Glendon summaris e s a
Times Mirror study that finds that our current group o f young people "knows less, cares
less, [and] votes less" than anytime during this century.10
While the initial supporters of no-fault divorce purportedly focused on the issue o f
civic good, there is reason to doubt a firm commitment behind their arguments. For
instance, in 1970, then-Govemor Brown appointed his Commission on the Family to
proceed in a "concentrated assault on the high incidence o f divorce and its tragic
consequences" in an attempt to right the social and economic ills o f divorce, namely
juvenile delinquency, crime, alcoholism, and welfare dependency.11 This argument
underlines the same basic principles as the proponents o f fault-based divorce champion;
however, it is clear the commission did not follow Governor Brown's adjuration, causing

8 Galston, 273.
9 See Galston, 274; Mason 45.
10 Mary Ann Glendon, "Virtue, Families, and Citizenship," in The Meaning o f the
Family in a Free Society, ed. W. Lawson Taitte (Dallas: The University of Texas at
Dallas, 1991); as quoted by William A. Galston, "The Reinstitutionalization o f
Marriage," in Promises to Keep, ed. David Popenoe (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1996) 274.
11Weitzman, 18.

98
some doubt that his reasons for appointing the commission were part o f the real
motivation propelling the reform movement.
Rather, it appears that the motive behind the reform o f the fault-based divorce
laws was one based more closely on equality and individual rights issues. According to
Weitzman, society had presumably recognized that the high divorce rates were a part o f
life: divorce was inevitable. The real thrust o f the movement was to end the adversarial
process, and to provide more equal treatment for both men and women in considerations
o f child custody, and awards of child support and alimony.12 It does not appear that
reducing the high divorce rates could have possibly been a realistic motive for the reform.
As David Blankenhom, from the Institute for American Values, is quoted as saying,
"When you change the laws to make divorce quick and easy, you don't need a PhD. to
know what will happen. You’ll erode the American family."13
The failure o f states to implement divorce reform during the 1990s makes it
obvious that our culture is not willing to support policies that return the nation to a
divorce system based on fault Consequendy, framing the question in terms of the
welfare o f children sets the stage for a very different look at whether or not reforming
divorce policy itself (i.e., making divorce more difficult to obtain) is in fact the best
answer to mitigating the effects of divorce.
At this point, consideration for cultural norms is vitally important in the analysis
and to the success o f any subsequent policy. For instance, while an objective for the

12Ibid., 16-17.
13Hanna Rosin, "Separation Anxiety," The New Republic, May 6,1996: 14.
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problem might be to lower the divorce rate so that children grow up in intact families, the
cultural norm clearly will not support a return to older systems that made divorce more
difficult to obtain. To be effective, points o f legislation must reconcile with the cultural
norm as it exists, not as we wish it to be.
Furthermore, the argument can be made that there are contending goals from at
least three basic theories strongly affecting the formulation of any effective divorce
reform policy: the goal of personal happiness (from rights-based theories), the goal of
equal treatment (from duty-based theories), and the goal o f reducing the adverse impact
o f divorce on society (from goal-based theories).
With this in mind, it becomes possible to see ways of opening new avenues of
discourse in the debate over divorce reform by determining where the values o f these
theories overlap.

For instance, only extreme individualists would argue that good

citizenship (civic virtue) has no place in society; few people would consider it desirable
to have a large culture o f children growing up in poverty; and most people would agree
that children should not be treated as means (i.e., pawns that parents use in hurting each
other, or for obtaining larger shares o f property distribution) but are ends in and o f
themselves.14
Consequently, fixture endeavors at policy reform should focus on protecting
children’s rights leaving fault and no-fault arguments out o f the debate entirely.
Additionally, divorce is a nationwide problem, and divorce reform should be crafted at

14Other aspects not considered in this thesis include goals to maintain the power
structure (men over women); goals to alter the status o f the welfare state (tax reform
initiative s to lessen welfare dependency o f divorced mothers); and goals reflecting the
proper function o f government.
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the national level to set a minimum standard for all states through a uniform divorce act,
or perhaps even better, through a uniform children-of-divorce protection, act.
We are beginning to see an acceptance o f this at the national level already. In
August, 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act
into public law.15 This law requires states to:
•

operate child support enforcement programs in order to receive federal welfare
funds;

•

reduce welfare benefits by at least 25% for mothers who refuse to help
establish paternity;

•

streamline the process for establishing paternity and expanding the in-hospital
paternity establishment program;

• implement expedited procedures for child support enforcement; establishing a
Federal Case Registry and a National Directory o f New Hires to track
"deadbeat" parents who cross state lines to avoid paying child support;
• develop uniform rules, procedures, and forms for interstate child support
cases; and
•

to increase child support collections by revoking driver's and professional
licenses, garnishing wages, and seizing assets.16

15The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act o f 1996,
Pulblic Law 104-193, August 22, 1996 (online); accessed on 12 April 2000; available
from http://wwwiihs.gov/news/press/1999pres/990803bJitml.
16 Ibid.
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The 1996 act is a recognition o f the consequences o f divorce as a national problem, and
demonstrates a willingness to act at that level, making it easier to create a uniform act to
protect children before a divorce occurs.
Implementing a uniform act to protect children would not change current divorce
laws for couples without children, but would protect the interests of the children o f
divorcing parents. The provisions o f this hypothetical act would include mandates such
as:
•

A written plan (to which both parents agree) that clearly outlines custody and
visitation arrangements.

•

Property and other asset settlements that focus on the welfare o f the children
first.

•

Consideration o f the non-custodial parent’s potential for earnings in
determining amounts o f child support.

•

Avenues for family courts to direct that child support payments be distributed
directly and automatically from wages o r bank accounts.

•

Language and strategies that explicitly enforce the non-custodial parent’s
obligation for child support regardless o f new familial responsibilities that
parent might choose (i.e., starting a new family with another partner, or
assuming responsibility for a new partner’s children by a previous spouse).

•

Counseling both before and after the divorce that provides parenting advice
and support for divorcing parents and their children. (While this counseling
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might be subsidized by the government, most o f the cost should be defrayed
by the divorcing couple.)
These mandates would hold for any divorce, no-fault or fault-based alike, and
would not impede a unilateral divorce action, except to the extent that the above
conditions are met before the divorce is finalized.
We can use Fineman's argument for "results-equality" as opposed to "ruleequality" in evaluating these proposals. Rather than evaluating the policy reform from
the standpoint o f individual equality, she asks whether the objectives o f no-fault reform
were met in terms of equity. In this way, she addresses the negative ramifications o f the
fault-based reform that so adversely affected women. Fineman's point is that while
individual equality for women is desirable in most situations, equity in terms o f financial
awards and property distributions is much more relevant in the case o f divorce involving
dependent children.17

Conclusion
In hindsight, it is easy to see that the initial divorce reform o f the 1970s was
destined to engender devastating although unintended outcomes for so many o f the
children o f divorce. It also is clear that the underlying theories that motivated that reform
- the emphasis on the right to the pursuit o f happiness that extends to the belief that
divorce should be available to unhappy couples and should be easy to obtain -are still
with us as a society today. Clearly, with the failure o f the reform efforts in the 1990s,

17See Fineman, Chapter 10.
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America has shown it is not interested m divorce reform that affects the terms o f divorce,
per se, and it has become apparent that there is really no cultural basis for returning to
fault-based divorce. Consequently, it is imperative to find other means o f mitigating the
effects of divorce policies as they stand today.
The welfare o f children o f divorce, the one inescapable consequence o f divorce
that must be dealt with, provides an avenue for drawing all factions closer to consensus
on reform to current policies. By building on whatever consensus can be achieved, it
should be possible to draft a policy which minimizes the polarization o f thought that the
current debate engenders: which keeps the responsibility for the children where it belongs
—with their natural parents; and which avoids most, if not all, unforeseen outcomes of
policies that have not been well-planned and analyzed at the outset.
For our policy makers, the dilemma in creating divorce reform or child protection
policies will continue to be one o f balancing the demands of a cultural norm based
predominantly on individual rights with the need to preserve and nurture the future of our
society. Given that Americans are not ready to accept divorce reform that significantly
curtails their freedom to divorce, the issue clearly becomes the protection o f our children:
for their own sakes and for the sake o f our community as a whole.
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